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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 Following the 1972 Easter Offensive, President Nixon is recorded discussing the nuclear 
option with Kissinger, stating that he would rather use the nuclear bomb against a strategic target 
than conventionally bomb Vietnam’s dike system. A nuclear attack on a different site, Nixon 
mused, would likely kill less Vietnamese than the proposed conventional bombing yet create a 
powerful “psychological” impact on the Soviets and the North Vietnamese.1 A few days later, 
Nixon observed to Kissinger that “the only place where you and I disagree…is with regard to the 
[nuclear] bombing. You’re so goddamned concerned about the civilians and I don’t give a damn. 
I don’t care.” Kissinger responded, “I’m concerned about the civilians because I don’t want the 
world to be mobilized against you as a butcher.”2 
 This exchange is a curious one, at least for advocates of traditional realist theories of 
nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction (MAD). Whereas most Cold War 
confrontations involved a nuclear-armed Soviet Union directly or indirectly involved in the 
conflict to such a degree that a nuclear deterrent could be argued to be present, such was not the 
case in Vietnam. While the Soviets passed along aid and materiel to the North Vietnamese, they 
were reluctant to become actively involved in the conflict.3 North Vietnam itself possessed no 
nuclear capabilities, meaning the conflict was strategically ideal for employing nuclear weapons 
without fear of retaliation in kind against the United States or its allies. The United States 
certainly did not lack in numbers of available warheads or a shortage of targets, and the military 
                                               
1 Executive Office Building Conversation no. 332-35, Nixon and Kissinger, April 25, 1972, White House Tapes, 
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Yorba Linda, CA. 
2 Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, [New York: Penguin Group, 2002], 419. 
3 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional 
Comparisons, [Stanford: Hoover Press Publications, 1988], 47. 
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doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the use of tactical nuclear weapons in disputes short 
of all-out nuclear exchange. Why then did we not see U.S. nuclear weapons in this case? 
 The leading response to this question and others concerning nuclear non-use in recent 
years has been the development of nuclear taboo theory. Proponents of this position argue that 
the sixty-year history of nuclear non-use since World War II is largely the result of an evolving 
set of international norms categorizing nuclear weapons as “unsafe,” “inhumane,” and somehow 
different from other, more conventional weapons as “weapons of mass destruction.4 In the 
exchange presented above, for example, taboo advocates point to the moralistic connotations of 
Kissinger’s use of the word “butcher” within the nuclear context and note the clear effect of 
international opinion on constraining U.S. military action. More broadly, taboo devotees cite the 
nuclear taboo as the primary casual mechanism for the lack of major war during the Cold War 
and consider the taboo to be generally stabilizing of the international system. 
 This conclusion, however, is equally problematic to the challenges deterrence faces in the 
Vietnam case. While a robust case can be made that the nuclear taboo constrained U.S. action in 
Vietnam, the taboo by no means reduced the severity of the conflict. To the contrary, over 3.6 
million Vietnamese and 58,000 Americans died in Vietnam between 1955 and 1975. Beginning 
in 1969, American bomber raids destroyed significant swaths of countryside and urban areas of 
Vietnam, employing herbicides, dropping napalm, and mining major ports and harbors.5 
McGeorge Bundy would later observe that some targets could have been hit with nuclear 
                                               
4 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 66. 
5 Nina Tannenwald, “Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26:4 (August 2006): 
676. 
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weapons “quite possibly with human losses lower than those of the war that was actually 
fought.”6 Clearly then, the nuclear taboo does not always only stabilize and prevent conflict. 
 This paper is motivated primarily by this question: what are the full theoretical 
implications of the nuclear taboo? Despite nearly two decades of work in the nuclear taboo 
research program, this question has shockingly gone almost completely ignored. Instead, most 
taboo scholars seem content to presume that the nuclear taboo only has a stabilizing impact on 
the international system. As I have just demonstrated, this is undoubtedly not a comprehensive 
picture of the taboo’s casual effects. With such a gap in the literature, a full theoretical 
examination of the casual effects of the nuclear taboo is necessary in order to assess the progress 
of the rest of the research program and open up additional avenues of research. 
 In this thesis, I argue that while the nuclear taboo does in fact act to prevent major war, it 
also has the ancillary effect of increasing the incidence and severity of low- and mid-level 
conflict. In brief, this stability paradox is a result of international perceptions of nuclear states’ 
willingness to use nuclear weapons in the face of the taboo. As the nuclear taboo increases in 
influence in the international system, states become more reticent to use their nuclear weapons 
for fear of incurring the reputation costs associated with violation of the taboo. Knowledge of 
this reluctance based on the nuclear taboo is not reserved to the nuclear state—because the 
nuclear taboo is an international norm, rival states can also logically determine that a nuclear 
state will be less willing to use nuclear weapons in conflict. As a consequence, these rival states 
will be much more likely to disregard any nuclear deterrent a nuclear state has placed over an 
area regarded as a peripheral foreign policy interest—that is, over areas not regarded as 
existential security concerns of the state. This disregard will then manifest itself as increased and 
                                               
6 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, [New York: Random House, 1988], 536. 
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more severe conflict short of major war than we would otherwise expect under a taboo regime 
that simply prevents war or a deterrent system that does the same. 
  If correct, this analysis of the nuclear taboo should be of significant interest to both 
researchers and policymakers. Within the policy establishment, it has generally been the stated 
goal for the last twenty years or more to increase the normative and legal prohibitions on the 
proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining and 
furthering international peace and stability. Should this analysis turn out to be correct, however, 
it may be eventually possible to determine what level of nuclear taboo is “enough,” such that the 
stabilizing impact of the paradox is maximized and the destabilizing component minimized—it 
may not in fact always be the case that a stronger nuclear taboo is better. Within the nuclear 
taboo research program, such a comprehensive analysis of the casual mechanisms of the taboo 
gives us the opportunity to reassess the state of the literature and review previous findings 
through our new, more powerful theoretical lens. Furthermore, by adding a significant casual 
effect to the taboo, entirely new questions regarding nuclear non-use policies and regimes open 
up to propel the research program forward in previously unexplored directions. 
 To explore my assertion that the nuclear taboo may have ancillary destabilizing side 
effects, I take a primarily theoretical approach. This is necessary in order to establish a 
foundational model on which to develop testable hypotheses both within this thesis and for future 
research. After developing an in-depth theoretical model for what I term the ‘nuclear taboo 
paradox,’ I develop two hypotheses suited for qualitative research methods in order to test the 
new theory. I opt for a qualitative research design for two reasons. First, as a plausibility probe 
for this new theory, a process-tracing approach is ideally suited to explore the nuance of the 
cases and confirm that it is in fact the paradoxical influence of the taboo at work rather than 
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some other casual mechanism. Second, as a norm the nuclear taboo is difficult to quantify even 
along a relative spectrum of robustness; even were such a measure to be developed, it would be 
infeasible here to develop a comprehensive dataset of the robustness of the nuclear taboo in all 
relevant states longitudinally over sixty years. 
 This thesis is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction is Chapter Two, 
where I develop my theory of the nuclear taboo paradox.  This chapter is divided into three 
principal sections. In the first component, I take an in-depth view of the current state of the 
literature on the nuclear taboo theory, including specific examination of the scholarly consensus 
of what the nuclear taboo is and is not, as well as how the nuclear taboo emerged and developed 
in the international system. From this review, I confirm that there is a significant gap in the 
literature concerning how the nuclear taboo might impact how other states will interact with 
nuclear states so constrained. In the second section of Chapter Two, I seek to develop a 
comprehensive theoretical understanding of the mechanisms underpinning what I term the 
‘nuclear taboo paradox,’ borrowing from the realist nuclear stability-instability paradox 
framework to do so. Third, I lay out a longitudinal research design focused on qualitative 
discourse analysis to test two hypotheses generated from my theoretical component. For the 
purposes of control and to cover the full scope of the international development of the taboo, I 
opt to longitudinally test the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as examples of Soviet challenges to the U.S. policy of containment. 
 In Chapter Three, I examine the elite-level brinkmanship behavior exhibited during the 
Korean War as my first case study. As the first serious ‘hot’ crisis of the Cold War, this conflict 
represents the ideal case to test the impact of a nascent nuclear taboo—and the casual 
mechanisms of the nuclear taboo paradox by extension—on the U.S.-Soviet dyad. Setting the 
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model for the remainder of this thesis, Chapter Three is divided into two major sections. In the 
first section, the history of the case is examined with a view toward identifying specific instances 
of brinkmanship and conflict escalation. In the second major section, I take each identified 
occurrence of such behavior and analyze the available evidence in light of the predictions of 
nuclear taboo theory and the nuclear taboo paradox, as well as two alternative lens theories—
deterrence and the nuclear stability-instability paradox. This chapter finds significant evidence 
that the normative taboo-based theories provide superior explanations to behavior exhibited 
during the Korean War than do the alternative lens theories. Between these two theories, there is 
more evidence in support of the nuclear taboo paradox and, in one of the two sub-cases, the 
nuclear taboo paradox explains the historical narrative much more comprehensively and 
accurately. 
 In Chapter Four, I progress to the Cuban Missile Crisis for my second case study. Having 
identified that the nuclear taboo was much more robust by the early 1960s relative to its 
influence during the Korean War, I predict that the nuclear taboo paradox will have a much 
stronger influence over elite crisis decision-making behavior. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first two sections mirror those in Chapter Three: the first section represents a 
historical narrative aimed at identifying discrete brinkmanship and escalation ‘events,’ while the 
second section seeks to further explore these events by analyzing what each of our four models 
predict for the case and then examining each sub-case of behavior in this light. A third section is 
appended to this chapter wherein the second hypothesis, which contains a longitudinal variable, 
is examined. In order to appropriately test the relative severity between the two conflicts, I take a 
counterfactual analysis approach to determine where each conflict fell historically relative to 
what its potential outcomes in extremis might have been. This chapter once again finds strong 
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evidence for the nuclear taboo paradox at work—indeed, the level of escalation and 
brinkmanship behavior seems to nearly exceed the major war caveat of our hypotheses. Turning 
to my second hypothesis, the results of Chapter Four indicate that, as predicted by the nuclear 
taboo paradox, the Cuban Missile Crisis was indeed more severe than the Korean War by most 
qualitative metrics. 
 Chapter Five brings us closer to the end of the Cold War and the contemporary era as I 
examine the effect of the nuclear taboo paradox on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Having 
established that the nuclear taboo is beginning to approach contemporary levels of robustness 
during the 1980s, I predict significant examples of brinkmanship and escalatory behavior as well 
as overall more severe low- to mid-level conflict relative to our other two cases. Like the 
chapters prior, Chapter Five is divided into three sections: historical narrative, examination of the 
evidence relative to the predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox and our three alternative 
theories, and a comparative counterfactual analysis of the invasion’s severity relative to the other 
two cases. Unlike the previous two chapters, Chapter Five suggests that the nuclear taboo 
paradox was not the most critical causal mechanism in this case. While the evidence analyzed in 
the case does substantiate the idea that the nuclear taboo had been internalized by many elite 
decision-makers by this time, I conclude that factors unique to the Afghanistan case attenuated 
the causal power of the nuclear taboo paradox. Among these factors were the U.S. reluctance to 
militarily engage in the developing world post-Vietnam, Soviet manpower needs elsewhere, and 
the Soviet change in leadership in 1985. There is also evidence suggesting that the nuclear taboo 
may not have been as engrained within the collective Soviet consciousness as it was in the 
Western world. 
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Taken together with the other two case studies, however, I conclude in Chapter Six that 
this evidence provides strong empirical support in favor of the nuclear taboo paradox. After 
again summarizing my basic argument and reviewing the results of each case study, I synthesize 
the individual empirical results into a holistic appraisal of my theory’s predictions. Having 
concluded that the nuclear taboo paradox provides robust predictions and explanations for a 
number of case studies from the Cold War, I then discuss future steps for the literature, both 
from the perspective of moving this new theory forward and reevaluating earlier works on the 
nuclear taboo. I also take a brief opportunity to discuss some of the policy implications of this 
research, as alluded to above. Finally, I conclude this thesis with some thoughts about the nuclear 
taboo and nuclear taboo paradox more generally. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY 
Both the policy and academic communities widely mark August 6, 1945 as a paradigm 
shift in international relations. On that date, the United States conducted the world’s first military 
deployment of a nuclear weapon. At approximately 8:15 am local time, the 393rd Bombardment 
Squadron’s Enola Gay released the thirteen kiloton “Little Boy” during an aerial bombardment 
of the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, a second nuclear weapon nicknamed “Fat 
Man” was detonated over the city of Nagasaki, releasing over twenty-one kilotons of atomic 
energy after a forty-three second free fall. Together, these two bombs destroyed over seven 
square miles and killed over 130,000 people instantaneously, making them the largest man-made 
explosions ever produced at the time. An additional 170,000 Japanese would later die from the 
lingering effects of radiation poisoning, bringing the two bombs’ death toll to over 200,000. 7 
The Truman administration’s goal behind the use of the weapons had been to bring the 
Pacific theater of World War II to a close without an invasion of the Japanese mainland. Six days 
after the Nagasaki bombing, following more than three and a half years of fighting, Japan 
unconditionally surrendered to the United States and its allies. In the immediate term, it seemed 
the tactic had been a success, so much so that the U.S. military establishment at once began calls 
to integrate the new weapons fully into all major military planning.8 U.S. public sentiment for the 
                                               
7 Franklin D’Olier, et al., “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” June 19, 1946, Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential 
Library, Independence, MO. 
8 This conclusion has since been disputed, with historians pointing to the Soviet entrance into the war, the fall of 
Okinawa, the Allied sea blockade, and the American concession to permit the Emperor to maintain a role in 
Japanese cultural life as all reasons which contributed to the 1945 surrender. Robert A. Pape, “Why Japan 
Surrendered,” International Security 18: 2 (Autumn 1993). 
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bomb also ran high, with over 85% of Americans in favor of the nuclear bombings of Japan 
according to a Gallup poll conducted just days after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.9  
The Soviet Union, finding itself now at odds with its wartime U.S. ally, quickly 
embarked upon its own program to acquire nuclear weapons and again level the technological 
playing field. With its own nuclear detonation in 1949, the Soviet Union prompted fears of a 
future war so destructive that it might destroy civilization itself. As tensions between the two 
powers heightened, apocalyptic predictions of cratered cities, total collapse of social 
infrastructure, and land so irradiated that agriculture would be impossible for hundreds of years 
became the order of the day. Everyone seemed to believe that nuclear war was inevitable and 
that the consequences would be dire. Even Albert Einstein allegedly quipped: “I know not with 
what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and 
stones.”10 
At the time, this prediction seemed reasonable to most observers.11 Most successful 
military technologies have been widely adopted by states, employed in warfare strategy and 
tactics, and used on the battlefield. History is full of examples of what happens to states that fail 
to adopt new military technologies promptly—the Prussian defeat of France during the Franco-
Prussian War and the Japanese victory against China in the First Sino-Japanese War are just two 
of many. In the first case, Prussian forces, supported by an extensive railroad network and 
breech-loading artillery, repelled the French incursion into the South German states; the French, 
who were largely committed to a more traditional school of military thought than the Prussians 
                                               
9 David W. Moore, “Majority Supports the Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan in WWII,” Gallup News Service, August 
5, 2005. 
10 Alice Calaprice and Trevor Lipscombe, Albert Einstein: A Biography [Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 
2005], 124. 
11 For example, see: The Atomic Scientists, “Did the Soviet Bomb Come Earlier Than Expected?,” Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists, October, 1949; William L. Laurence, “How Soon Will Russia Have the A-Bomb?,” Saturday 
Evening Post , November 6, 1948; Henry H. Arnold, Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air 
Forces to the Secretary of War, 12 November 1945. 
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were, had explicitly decided against capitalizing on these technological advances in the years 
running up to the conflict. In the second case, Japan handily defeated the Chinese in 1876 after 
just six months, largely due to superiority in naval technology. After such defeats, states are 
generally quick to acquire the technologies they found themselves lacking in the last war and to 
employ them extensively in the next one. To most experts then, the eventual proliferation and 
deployment of nuclear weapons into standard warfare seemed inevitable. 
Yet, to date, the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki over sixty years ago remain 
the only use of nuclear weapons against enemy targets, a remarkable fact in a world that has 
produced over 60,000 nuclear warheads.12 Constructivists have attributed the non-use of nuclear 
weapons to the emergence of a “nuclear taboo.”13 In short, the nuclear taboo suggests that over 
time states and political activists have deemed the use of nuclear weapons to be immoral and 
unjustifiable. As the taboo has strengthened, the reputational costs of using nuclear weapons 
have grown substantially to the point that states are heavily disincentivized from the bomb in 
war.14  Today, any country that uses a nuclear weapon in a first-strike capacity will assuredly be 
condemned by the international community and would almost certainly face international 
sanction. Even in a second-strike scenario, especially a tactical or limited one, states would have 
to carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of nuclear retaliation. This would particularly 
be the case if a non-nuclear response was practicable. 
While a substantial literature surrounding the nuclear taboo has emerged in the past 
decade, much of it has focused on the positive effect the nuclear taboo has had on international 
                                               
12 Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 
[Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998], 70. 
13 Nina Tannenwald first addressed the nuclear non-use phenomenon from an ideational-normative framework. This 
is in opposition to most Cold War-era explanations, such as mutually assured destruction (MAD), which are 
grounded in realist assumptions that reject the importance of ideas and norms in the international system. 
14 Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29:4 (Spring 
2005): 8. 
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security. Specifically, researchers have focused on how the nuclear taboo contributes to nuclear 
non-use, prevents the outbreak of major war, and responding to their critics, in particular realists. 
As essential as this line of inquiry is to the nuclear taboo research program, however, scholars 
have overlooked the possible destabilizing security consequences of the taboo.  
 In this chapter, I argue that a strong nuclear taboo has both stabilizing and destabilizing 
consequences. As has been demonstrated in the literature, the nuclear taboo has a stabilizing 
effect on international politics by promoting the continued non-use of nuclear weapons. 
However, I argue that it also has the potential to produce greater conventional conflict among 
states, along the lines of the nuclear stability-instability paradox. That is, the taboo additionally 
reduces the credibility of nuclear threats involved in deterrence and compellence to such a degree 
that rival states can feel secure enough to engage in brinkmanship behavior and low-level 
conflict with nuclear-armed states. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, I review the existing literature on the 
nuclear taboo, examining arguments both for and against its influence in the interstate system. I 
argue that this research program, while important in that it established the existence of the 
nuclear taboo, has overlooked the taboo’s possible destabilizing consequences. Second, I develop 
a theory of a nuclear taboo paradox which states that a sufficiently strong nuclear taboo could 
produce its own stability-instability paradox, destabilizing the international system by increasing 
the frequency and intensity of conflict. Third, I present my research design. To test the nuclear 
taboo paradox, I conduct a longitudinal case study of the United States and the Soviet Union 
between 1945 and 1990, demonstrating that as the nuclear taboo strengthened, the frequency and 
intensity of conventional conflict and brinkmanship behavior involving the nuclear-armed states 
increased. 
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Literature Review 
 
The central thesis of Michael Mandelbaum’s book, The Nuclear Revolution, is that the 
detonation of the first nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in a revolutionary 
era of international politics where “familiar moral categories, ideas of right and wrong in 
warfare, do not fit.”15 This revolution forced policymakers and academics alike to reevaluate 
their ideas of the rationale and modes of war. The ever growing body of literature on nuclear 
weapons and their consequences suggests that we are still attempting to fully comprehend this 
revolution.  
For much of the last sixty years, the response to this revolution has been largely driven by 
theories of deterrence. In the post-Cold War era, however, many scholars have found such 
explanations inadequate. With the emergence of constructivism and its emphasis on the role of 
ideas in the international system, some scholars have begun to attribute the non-use of nuclear 
weapons to a shift in international norms—or the emergence of, as they term it, a “nuclear 
taboo.” This research program to date has broadly focused on confirming the existence of such a 
norm and investigating the stabilizing effect of the taboo on state behavior. Very little scholarly 
work, however, has been conducted on potentially destabilizing consequences of the taboo. This 
section seeks to trace the development of the nuclear taboo literature, with an aim to situate the 
subsequent theoretical discussion within the proper context. 
 
Origins of Taboo Theory 
 
 From the beginning of the nuclear era through the conclusion of the Cold War, the study 
of international relations was carried out predominantly through a rationalist lens. This 
theoretical paradigm gave rise to theories of deterrence and mutually assured destruction (MAD), 
                                               
15 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981], 4. 
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which would become the primary explanatory models for the nuclear non-use phenomenon. The 
logic of nuclear deterrence, at its core, is no different than that of conventional deterrence. 
Deterrence theory contends that states attempt to prevent attacks on their territory and foreign 
policy interests by both implicitly and explicitly threatening military, economic, diplomatic, and 
other forms of reprisal on any external actors so foolhardy to do so.16 Kenneth Waltz perhaps 
best explicates the logic of deterrence, writing that it is “dissuading [an enemy] from an action 
by frightening that [enemy] with the consequences of the action.”17 MAD is a specific form of 
deterrence, under which both states on a dyad are deterred from attacking one another with 
nuclear weapons for fear of mutual annihilation. This fear rests on the principle of second-strike 
capability, or a state’s ability to launch a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike even after a full-
scale nuclear assault. Most realists consider MAD an especially stable form of deterrence, as 
states view the cost of retaliatory nuclear strikes on their civilian populations as too costly for all 
but the most fundamental security objectives pertaining to national survival. 
With the abrupt end of the Cold War and new archival evidence pertaining to national 
security decision-making during that period, however, some academics began to doubt the 
universality of the MAD model. One important critique came out of the constructivist school of 
thought. While not denying the validity and utility of the “balance of terror” logic of MAD, 
constructivists, in particular Nina Tannenwald, noted that the historical record has not always 
been consistent with predictions of the MAD model. To the contrary, historical evidence 
suggests numerous cases where the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered when MAD 
                                               
16 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,” Review of International Studies 37 (2011):  
741. 
17 Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84 (Sep. 1990): 732. 
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would dictate stability or where non-nuclear states seemed to ignore the strategic imperatives of 
nuclear deterrence.18 
 Specifically, Tannenwald and others cite three central theoretical and empirical problems 
with the MAD model. First, there are a number of cases where the logic of MAD does not 
apply—such as those involving conflict dyads where only one state possessed nuclear 
weapons—and yet no nuclear weapons were used. This is a significant challenge to the theory, 
which posits that the only constraints states feel with regard to nuclear non-use are those that 
credibly threaten their survival. If the entirety of the nuclear non-use phenomenon could be 
explained solely by the twin logics of nuclear deterrence and MAD, we would expect to have 
seen at least some cases where nuclear weapons were employed in conflicts characterized by 
nuclear asymmetry.19 This empirical problem also extends to the early years of the nuclear age, 
when the United States retained a monopoly on nuclear weapons amidst a growing rivalry with 
the non-nuclear Soviet Union and yet failed to leverage this advantage to prevent the emergence 
of bipolarity in the international system.20 
 The second major critique constructivists bring to bear against MAD is theoretical. 
Tracing out the logic of MAD explicitly, Tannenwald and others note that a defining assumption 
of the argument is that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons, however slight, is a 
sufficiently costly potential to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. While it is objectively true 
that nuclear weapons are more powerful per pound of raw material or per weapon than 
“conventional” weapons, the destruction they cause in the aggregate can be equaled by 
                                               
18 One such example is the Egyptian invasion of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. S. Aronson, “The Nuclear 
Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations 7 (1984): 116. 
19 T. V. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of International 
Studies 36:1 (2010): 853. 
20 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 33. 
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traditional incendiary bombing.21 Viewed from such a materialist perspective, nuclear weapons 
only differ from “conventional” weapons in their efficiency—other than the radiation side effect, 
there is little qualitatively different about their destructive capacity. To that end, we must then 
question how high potential costs must be to be deemed “unacceptable” by foreign leaders and 
whether or not that cost-benefit analysis holds constant over time. Indeed, as a state’s economic 
output and ability to rebuild following conflict increases with demographic and technological 
changes, one would anticipate that the level of “acceptable cost” engendered by going to war 
would increase as well. This suggests that the destructive power of nuclear weapons alone is 
insufficient to support MAD in all cases, even assuming a universe of perfectly rational actors. 
 The question of rationality leads us to the third major critique of MAD. While the 
assumption of rationality is frequently assumed within the realist paradigm of international 
relations for the sake of theoretical parsimony, numerous empirical studies have demonstrated 
that this assumption may not be valid in the real world. Participants in controlled laboratory 
experiments frequently show that exogenous factors such as high-pressure stress, wishful 
thinking, and motivated bias all can cause shifts away from optimal game-theoretic decision-
making.22 Even in situations where such factors are eliminated or controlled for, political 
psychologists have found that actors often fail to “calculate” the predicted “optimal” decision, 
instead relying on cognitive shortcuts, innate biases, and cultural perspectives to process 
decision-relevant information.23 When it is noted that additional factors such as domestic politics 
or institutional incentives or constraints can complicate state leadership decision-making, 
                                               
21 In fact, the American incendiary bombing of Tokyo during WWII actually resulted in more casualties and 
economic damage than did either individual atomic bomb at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Richard Rhodes, The Making 
of the Atomic Bomb [New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1986], 599. 
22 Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology & Deterrence [Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1985], 80. 
23 Rose McDermott and Jonathan A, Cowden, “The Effects of Uncertainty and Sex in a Crisis Simulation Game,” 
International Interactions 27: 4 (2001): 362. 
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constructivists find that the concept of actor rationality can only be defined on the individual 
level; even then, such rationality is subject to influence by external factors unique to the specific 
situation under consideration.24 This suggests that traditional models of deterrence—and by 
extension, MAD—may not be as applicable to the real world as previously thought. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo 
To explain the non-use of the bomb, Tannenwald and others posit the gradual 
development of a taboo against any use of nuclear weapons. Under this model, state behavior is 
not solely explained by the cold, logical calculations of MAD, but also by an ever-growing 
normative prohibition that considers nuclear weapons unethical and immoral. This nuclear taboo 
is defined as a “widespread popular revulsion against nuclear weapons and widely held 
inhibitions on their use.”25 Taboo theorists argue that this normative prohibition, which 
categorizes nuclear weapons as something particularly special and improper for use in war, is 
actually the driving force behind the history of nuclear non-use post-WWII. 
Because it is a normative concept, the nuclear taboo is not a fixed variable, but rather 
varies in its intensity and its relative significance to policymakers across time. Specifically, 
scholars have argued that, as it has become increasingly internalized by domestic populations, 
international institutions, and elite decision-makers, the nuclear taboo has strengthened in its 
causal power during the Cold War and to the present day. The result of this has been that nuclear 
states are constrained in their ability to utilize their weapons in actual combat, to the extent that 
we have not seen nuclear strikes since the 1945 Japanese bombings. 
As a taboo, this norm represents a de facto, rather than a de jure, prohibition on the first-
strike use of nuclear weapons. Sociological research suggests that taboos generally are instituted 
                                               
24 Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” Security Studies 15:3 (2006). 
25 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 9. 
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to protect individuals and societies from behavior widely regarded as dangerous by making it 
normatively prohibitive to enact such a behavior. These beliefs can be substantiated through 
observed actual danger from an activity, the product of elite or interest group manipulation of 
public imagination, grassroots activism or hysteria, or some combination of these factors.26 Once 
a belief of danger has been established, the norm becomes attached to certain costs resulting 
from violations, which usually strengthen in their severity the longer the taboo remains in 
place.27 
Clearly these criteria hold for nuclear weapons, which have been widely designated as the 
most powerful and destructive weapons states have developed to date by both scientists and 
political activists. However, unlike most taboos, possession of the taboo object—in this case, 
nuclear weapons—is not also prohibited. Instead, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has 
been enacted to make it broadly unacceptable for new states to join the “nuclear club,” but states 
already in possession of nuclear weapons are permitted to maintain their arsenals, even though 
they are normatively prevented from using them. This has created a curious situation, where the 
nuclear taboo is widely acknowledged and yet simultaneously we see a normative “totemization” 
attached to the possession of these weapons, whereby the weapons have become an implicit 
symbol of “great power” status.28 This legal quirk suggests that the taboo has not been 
completely formalized. However, this is not to say that that the norm has not been successful. As 
Gizewski discusses, the primary success of the nuclear taboo has been in preventing further 
nuclear detonations during conflict as a direct result of the normative view that all nuclear 
                                               
26 Webster Hutton, Taboo: A Sociological Study [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942], 17. 
27 Some critics take issue with the definition of a ‘taboo,’ contending that the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 
is a tradition, not a norm. T.V. Paul argues that: “a taboo is…generally associated with such qualities as 
absoluteness, unthinkingness, and taken-for-grantedness,” and believes this does not accurately reflect state attitudes 
towards atomic weapons. Broadly, this argument is quite weak, grounding itself more in semantics rather than any 
particular substantive difference. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition?,” 867. 
28 William Walker, “The Absence of a Taboo on the Possession of Nuclear Weapons,” Review of International 
Studies 36 (2010). 
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weapons are unique and equivalent, regardless of size, power, level of fallout, or any other 
metric.29 
 
Historical Development of the Nuclear Taboo 
 
The ideational underpinnings of the taboo actually pre-date nuclear weapons themselves. 
The concept of weapons so destructive that they require either moral or legal prohibition against 
their use or possession dates back to World War I, when the widespread use of chemical 
weapons on the battlefield provoked massive public outcry.30 The use of these new weapons was 
subsequently banned under international law with the Geneva Protocol on the grounds that they 
were inhumane and did not discriminate between civilian and military personnel.31 The concept 
of “weapons of mass destruction,” which categorizes some weapons as more heinous and 
immoral than others, was first used by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1937 in reference to the 
aerial bombings of Guernica, Spain.32 The term acquired its more contemporary usage as a 
synonym for non-conventional weapons—in other words, weapons with destructive capabilities 
not based off of kinetic energy or chemical combustion—almost immediately following the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in late November 1945 and early 1946. Variations on the 
phrase then featured in U.S. executive branch memos, United Nations resolutions, and the 
scholarly lectures.33 Clearly then, the seeds of the idea that nuclear weapons constitute a new 
category of especially abhorrent weapons was present from the very beginning of the atomic age. 
                                               
29 Peter Gizewski, “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics,” 
International Journal 51:3 (Summer, 1996). 
30 Dennis M. Gormley, “Securing Nuclear Obsolescence,” Survival 48:3 (2006): 127. 
31 League of Nations, “The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” June 17, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series 94: 66-74. 
32 Cosmo Gordon Lang, “Archbishop's Appeal: Individual Will and Action; Guarding Personality,” Times (London), 
28 December 1937. 
33 U.S. Executive Office of the President, NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 
National Security Council, [Washington, D.C., April 14, 1950]; “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the 
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Tannenwald and others view the evolution of the nuclear taboo as the product of a 
competition between two divergent conceptions of nuclear weapons. In the first view, nuclear 
weapons were seen as powerful weapons integral to future U.S. national security. This was 
primarily the position of military leaders and many policymakers in the wake of the Japanese 
bombings. In the second view, which ultimately became the foundation for the contemporary 
nuclear taboo, nuclear weapons were regarded as terrible, inhumane, and even evil weapons that 
should never be used again. This perspective was first espoused by scientists who worked on the 
atomic bomb with the Manhattan Project and was quickly echoed by religious leaders and some 
policymakers, such as the U.S. Federal Council of Churches, Paul Nitze, and Ralph Bard.34 
This second view was initially created by two independent groups, each of which had 
their own reasons for seeking a prohibition on the future use of nuclear weapons in combat. 
Broadly, these two sides can be divided into political and moral camps.35 On the political side, 
the Soviet Union and its satellite states worked vigorously to encourage a nuclear taboo in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. This was not because the Soviet Union had any normative or moral 
qualms about the atomic bomb, but rather because it sought to delegitimize a possible nuclear 
confrontation with the United States while Moscow lacked the capabilities to deter a nuclear 
attack.36 Indeed, the Soviet Union’s efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons declined once 
second-strike capabilities were obtained. This represents a view of norms used strategically to 
further the national interest. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” January 24, 1946, Resolutions Adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly During its First Session. 
34 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 74; Franklin D’Olier, et al., “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey;” Edward 
L. Long, Jr., The Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950], 7; George L. 
Harrison to Henry L. Stimson on behalf of Ralph Bard, June 28, 1945, Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb Papers, 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. 
35 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” 19. 
36 Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Disarmament Movement [Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009], 42. 
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As the Soviet Union sought to undermine the United States’ nuclear monopoly, activists 
and several Western and foreign leaders, such as David Lilienthal, Carlos Romulo, and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, concurrently spearheaded the beginning of an antinuclear global movement.37 
Composed initially of Manhattan Project scientists such as Leo Szilard and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, this group argued that the atomic bomb threatened the future of the environment 
and civilization itself.38 The antinuclear movement literally arose from the radioactive ashes of 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, where physicists, medical professionals, and 
policymakers gradually began to comprehend the magnitude and longevity of the effects of 
nuclear fallout.39 As this movement gained traction in the United States and other Western states, 
policymakers suddenly found themselves on the defensive on questions of nuclear strategy and 
possession. As early as mid-1946, Truman administration officials had to justify the legitimacy 
and morality of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.40 Growing public doubt and opposition 
to nuclear weapons then began to curtail the government’s ability to employ nuclear weapons in 
combat situations, although the U.S. military continued to draw up extensive plans for the use of 
nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War. 
 The strength of the nuclear taboo has since grown at a relatively steady rate. Early in the 
1950s, increasing evidence of the lingering effects of radiation and new concerns about nuclear 
proliferation led to more vigorous public opposition to nuclear weapons. At the elite level, this 
view gained acceptance—albeit more gradually. Many U.S. policymakers still chafed against the 
                                               
37 Ibid., 48. 
38 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” 19. 
39 Andrew J. Rotter, Hiroshima: The World’s Bomb [New York: Oxford University Press, 2008], 232. 
40 The most notable of early journalist critiques of the atomic bombings of Japan comes from New Yorker writer 
John Hershey, whose 31,000 word piece “Hiroshima” brought the first detailed accounts of post-bomb survivors to 
the American public. Soon after, the Truman administration began a concerted campaign to minimize negative 
public reaction to the direct devastation and emerging side-effects of the atomic bomb. John Hershey, “Hiroshima,” 
The New Yorker, August 31, 1946. 
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taboo, and consistently sought creative ways to subvert the moral constraints of the norm.41 
Although the nuclear taboo has yet to achieve full legal status like the prohibitions on chemical 
weapons, a high degree of institutionalization within organizations like the United Nations has 
provided momentum for furthering restrictions on the testing and use of nuclear weapons. This 
further accelerated the development and evolution of the nuclear taboo. Today, several states still 
explicitly reserve the right to use their nuclear weapons—even as a first strike. But it is difficult 
to imagine a scenario where any state would find the costs of lost prestige and reputation, to say 
nothing of the possible military reprisals from outraged third parties, acceptable relative to the 
benefit gained from even a limited use of nuclear weapons. 
 
What’s Missing 
 
A great deal of work has been conducted on establishing that the nuclear taboo is present 
and at least partly responsible for why nuclear weapons have not be used since the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombings. But additional scholarship is needed on the security implications of a 
strong nuclear taboo. To date, only passing remarks have been made about the effect of the 
nuclear taboo on the credibility of nuclear deterrence and any destabilizing effects it might have 
on the international system. Gizewski does write that “strict observance of the taboo does not 
preclude the onset of deadly international conflict. Not only does the emerging international 
environment offer a range of possibilities for violence below the nuclear threshold, but, in certain 
circumstances, the taboo itself could encourage its outbreak.”42 However, little else has been 
made of this hypothesis. This is surprising, as nuclear strategies of deterrence and compellence 
are fundamentally grounded in the threat of a credible nuclear response to aggression. As the 
                                               
41 Toshihiro Higuchi, “’Clean’ Bombs: Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Strategy in the 1950s,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29:1 (2006). 
42 Gizewski, “Winning Weapon,” 418. 
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nuclear taboo has strengthened over time, the reputational costs of violating the taboo have 
likewise increased, likely undermining the credibility of deterrence and MAD. It is the purpose 
of this study to fill this gap in the literature by articulating how the nuclear taboo might 
inadvertently destabilize the international system through such an increase in reputational costs, 
a phenomenon which I term the “nuclear taboo paradox.” 
 
Nuclear Taboo and Conflict 
 
Can a strong nuclear taboo make conventional conflict more likely? In this section, I first 
discuss the literature on the nuclear stability-instability paradox. I then outline my theory of a 
taboo paradox. Finally, I generate several hypotheses that follow from this theory, which are 
tested in the case studies found in subsequent chapters. 
 
The Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
 Using the basic deterrence logic of MAD, authors such as Glenn Snyder and Michael 
Krepon argue that the probability of direct conflict and major war is unlikely between nuclear-
armed states—the costs of such an exchange would be far in excess of any anticipated benefits 
for all but the most existential of conflicts.43 For the same reason, however, the nuclear stability-
instability paradox predicts that nuclear states have increased confidence that low-level or 
indirect conflicts will not spiral out of control into wider wars. This is because all states are 
aware of this aversion to nuclear conflict and know that states will be unwilling to risk nuclear 
holocaust over peripheral or non-existential disputes. As a consequence, such states actually tend 
to be more aggressive in their foreign policy. While states in non-nuclear dyads might fear that 
an opposing state might escalate smaller conflicts into war as a brinkmanship tactic, states under 
                                               
43 Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” The 
Henry Stimson Center (May 2003). 
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MAD can be relatively confident that opposing leaders will be reluctant to permit low-level or 
indirect conflict to escalate past a certain point for fear of an all-out war involving nuclear 
weapons.44 
Snyder is credited with the first extended analysis of the nuclear stability-instability 
paradox, although the concept dates back to 1954 in the writings B. H. Liddell Hart.45 In “The 
Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” Snyder articulates how the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is simultaneously a stabilizing and destabilizing force in interstate relations, remarking 
on nuclear weapons’ tendency to simultaneously stimulate and inhibit war.46 This work was 
further developed by Robert Jervis in “The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and 
the Prospect of Armageddon,” where he discusses the danger of a world where policymakers 
believe they can leverage MAD to manage crises in their favor.47 Historically, this was 
manifested in the Eisenhower administration’s policy of massive retaliation and the decision of 
subsequent administrations to qualify such a policy to improve its credibility.48 Scott Sagan and 
Kenneth Waltz famous debated both the stabilizing and destabilizing attributes of permitting 
widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons.49 Most notably, Sagan observes that where nuclear 
weapons can provide a sufficient deterrent under a number of conditions—including adequate 
civilian control over the military, survivable second-strike capability, and plentiful accident-
prevention measures—they can also encourage preventive wars during state development of 
                                               
44 S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” 
International Security 30:2 (Fall 2005): 132. 
45 Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox.” 
46 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury (Ed.) The Balance of Power 
[Scranton: Chandler, 1965]: 185-201. 
47 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, [Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989], 138. 
48 Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox.” 
49 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, [New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2002], 78. 
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nuclear weapons capabilities, increase conflict over peripheral interests, and intensify the use and 
frequency of brinkmanship tactics.50 
 
The Taboo Paradox 
 
 As previously discussed, a significant portion of the taboo literature has been devoted to 
analyzing the history and influence of the nuclear taboo, while largely neglecting other possible 
effects it might have on the stability of the international system. The stabilizing effects are 
relatively apparent—a stronger nuclear taboo makes it increasingly unlikely that states will 
escalate conflict to the nuclear level due to the political and reputation costs associated with 
violating the prohibition. Certainly the norm has had a stabilizing effect, as it contributes to the 
reigning sixty-year status quo of nuclear non-use. However, there likely are other ancillary 
effects of the nuclear taboo that need to be more thoroughly investigated, some of which may be 
destabilizing. 
When the nuclear taboo is examined closely, it is probable that one of the major side 
effects of a stronger norm is a reduction in the credibility of nuclear deterrence. This follows 
logically, as all states are cognizant of the taboo not only as it applies to their own actions, but 
also as it applies to the actions of other states. As the nuclear taboo makes it prohibitive to even 
contemplate employing nuclear weapons against other states, this credibility is severely 
weakened. This then suggests that states seeking to challenge the status quo are more likely to 
disregard nuclear threats, knowing that no state would actually follow through on such a threat 
for reasons short of national survival. Challenger states then feel more confident in initiating 
low-level conflicts—provided the conventional balance of power is in their favor. This implies 
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an inverse relationship between the strength and stability of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear 
taboo. To wit, as the nuclear taboo increases in strength, the deterrent power of MAD decreases. 
 The destabilizing effects of the nuclear taboo extend not only to the incidence of conflict, 
but also to the severity of interstate conflict. With a strong nuclear taboo, states feel more 
confident that nuclear weapons will not be launched as a retaliatory measure against aggressive 
foreign policy adventures. As a consequence, both nuclear and non-nuclear states will be more 
inclined to initiate crises and conflicts as a means to elicit concessions from opposing nuclear 
states. However, because awareness of the taboo is universal, the opposing state will see through 
this strategy and attempt to bolster its own deterrent threats. This leads to an escalation of 
conflict, as State A attempts to call State B’s nuclear bluff and as State B attempts to demonstrate 
its readiness to retaliate, in a pattern of behavior frequently described as brinkmanship tactics.51 
Indeed, these spirals of conflict may escalate into major wars if the nuclear taboo is sufficiently 
strong. While we have yet to see such a war occur, likely due to the post-Cold War American 
global hegemony, major hostilities between two nuclear states could escalate to a nuclear 
exchange. Formally, the above logic leads us to two hypotheses: 
H1: As the strength of the nuclear taboo increases, nuclear-armed states will exhibit a 
greater proclivity toward dispute escalation through the use of brinkmanship 
tactics and escalatory behavior.  
 
H2: As the strength of the nuclear taboo increases, nuclear-armed states will engage 
in increasingly severe low- to mid-level conflicts. 
 
In Hypothesis 1, we should see nuclear-armed states engage more frequently and more intensely 
in conflict escalation and brinkmanship tactics as the strength of the nuclear taboo increases. 
                                               
51 Brinkmanship tactics refer to the “polic[ies] or practice…of pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster 
(to the limits of safety) in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome by forcing the opposition to make 
concessions.” Brinkmanship is a decision by State A to escalate tensions to a point considered unacceptably risky by 
State B. This forces State B to capitulate, provided that State A can credibly threaten escalation and potentially 
conflict. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” Review of International Political 
Economy 14:3 (2007): 468. 
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This is because, if correct, the nuclear taboo paradox anticipates increased bluffing and 
decreased deterrent efficacy under a stronger nuclear taboo. Likewise, in Hypothesis 2 we should 
expect to see increasingly severe conflict—with the constraint that it will remain short of major 
war—due to an increased perception of higher normative and reputational costs to actually 
enacting a nuclear deterrent. If these hypotheses are incorrect, we would expect no change or 
fewer incidents of brinkmanship tactics and no change or a decrease in the severity of conflict 
involving nuclear states. Hypothesis 1 then more precisely pertains to strategic behavior within 
crises, whereas Hypothesis 2 specifically covers conflict itself. 
 In this section, I reviewed the literature on the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. I 
concluded that an important explanation for the nuclear non-use phenomenon is found in the 
nuclear taboo, which argues that an evolving normative prohibition against the use of nuclear 
weapons in combat is chiefly responsible for their non-use by policymakers and military 
officials. This approach is not fully developed, however, as to date it has failed to explore 
possible destabilizing consequences of the nuclear taboo. I proposed a logic under which the 
nuclear taboo can have destabilizing consequences, namely that it adds such normative and 
reputational costs to the use of nuclear weapons that the credibility of a nuclear deterrent in most 
circumstances is substantially undermined. From this logic I generated two hypotheses: first, that 
we should see nuclear-armed states engage more frequently and more intensely in conflict 
escalation and brinkmanship tactics and second, that we should see nuclear-armed states engage 
in increasingly severe conflict—short of major war—as the strength of the nuclear taboo 
increases. The next step is to develop a research design that will allow us to test these hypotheses 
empirically. 
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Research Design 
 
In the previous section, I outlined two different hypotheses detailing what we should 
expect to see if the nuclear taboo paradox operates in the international system. To test these 
hypotheses, I conduct a longitudinal case study to observe whether the taboo heightened conflict 
in specific disputes and whether, as the taboo gained in strength throughout the twentieth 
century, the intensity of conflict short of war and brinkmanship behavior also increased. 
In this section, I outline my research methodology, beginning with a discussion of my 
overall research design. In the second part of this section, I discuss how I test my variables—the 
presence and relative strength of the nuclear taboo, brinkmanship tactics, and conflict severity. In 
the final component of this section, I detail my criteria for case study selection and identify the 
cases I have chosen for closer analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
Case Study Research Design 
 
In order to best test my theory of the nuclear taboo paradox, I employ a predominantly 
qualitative approach. Specifically, I utilize a longitudinal case study model, under which I 
control for such variables as polarity, existing rivalries, borders, and a number of other variables 
known to influence interstate disputes and conflict. I select a qualitative approach over a more 
quantitative one for a number of reasons. Foremost among these is the nature of the nuclear 
taboo itself—as a moral-normative phenomenon, it is very difficult to conceptualize a useful and 
valid quantitative measure of the strength of the taboo at any given point in time or in any 
specific incident. Indeed, particularly for the early days of the nuclear taboo, theory would 
predict that the influence of the taboo would vary widely depending on which actors were 
involved in the incident. As a consequence, the influence of the nuclear taboo is best captured 
through detailed tracing of events. Second, as a new theoretical contribution to the nuclear taboo 
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program, a qualitative approach permits the overall logic of the nuclear taboo paradox to be 
examined within the context of actual historical events. This preliminary test, if successful, can 
then serve as the foundation of future, perhaps more quantitative testing. 
The research I undertake in the following chapters broadly seeks to answer three 
questions. The first is whether the nuclear taboo, rather than nuclear deterrence or other 
structural factors, is operative in the decision-making process of each individual case. If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, as Tannenwald’s basic logic argues it should, I then 
determine whether there is evidence suggestive that the nuclear taboo paradox is operative in the 
cases as well. As articulated in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the primary evidence of the nuclear taboo 
paradox in these cases will be greater use of brinkmanship tactics and more severe low- and mid-
level conflict. Finally, taking advantage of the longitudinal structure of my cases, I conduct a 
comparative analysis across cases to demonstrate that the destabilizing consequences of the 
nuclear taboo paradox increase as the nuclear taboo also has strengthened over time. 
 
Variable Operationalization—Measuring the Taboo 
 
 Before we proceed to the actual case study selection, we must first briefly discuss the 
operationalization of my variables. For the purpose of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, there are three 
critical variables requiring measurement—the presence and relative strength of the nuclear taboo, 
the incidence and extent of the use of brinkmanship tactics, and the relative severity of low- and 
mid-level conflict present in each case. The following paragraphs discuss how I measure each of 
these variables in this study. 
As discussed above, a critical component of the literature on the nuclear taboo is 
adequately demonstrating that it is the nuclear taboo, rather than nuclear deterrence or other 
structural factors, at work in my cases. As such, in each case I first examine whether the nuclear 
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taboo paradox is either causally active or inactive before I move on to my comparisons of these 
crises over time. I accomplish this primarily through analysis of elite-level discourse and 
rhetoric, examining relevant decision-making efforts for language indicative of the nuclear 
taboo. More precisely, we would expect elites affected by the nuclear taboo paradox to include 
commentary regarding feelings of constraint by public and international opinion, the morality of 
nuclear weaponry, and distinctions between conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction. Explicit commentary by elites about a taboo or morality would be a strong indicator 
that the nuclear taboo is influencing decision-making, but is not required. Evidence of the 
nuclear taboo within civil society and state populations more broadly will also be considered 
when evaluating the strength of the taboo in a given case. 
In the case that the nuclear taboo is not at work, we would not expect to see much, if any, 
such discourse or civic activism, as the alternative case for the non-use phenomenon is the realist 
structural one of nuclear deterrence and MAD. If this is in fact the case, we would rather expect 
elite decision-makers to discuss dyadic disputes in terms of the balance of power, first- and 
second-strike capabilities, and the material costs and benefits of escalation and intensified 
conflict. Commentary about morality would not be expected under this scenario. 
A caveat should be made here that, at least in democratic states where cultural values 
may not precisely match up with raw balance of power calculations, we may still see some 
public rhetoric from elite decision-makers seemingly indicative of the nuclear taboo. This would 
be expected because democratic states, particularly modern Western ones, have a tradition of 
moral rhetoric in their foreign policy.52 However, we would only expect such rhetoric in the 
public sphere, while the actual decision-making process should still largely match the realist 
                                               
52 Dominic Tierney, “’Pearl Harbor in Reverse:’ Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War 
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predictions. This distinction between public rhetoric and private, elite-level decision-making 
makes it all the more critical that any qualitative analysis of this question focus on all available 
written and recorded information concerning the actual decision-making process instead of just 
the actual outcomes of the disputes. 
 
Variable Operationalization—Measuring Escalation & Brinkmanship 
 
 Hypothesis 1 is chiefly concerned with brinkmanship behavior and conflict escalation. As 
outlined earlier in this section, I hypothesize that as the nuclear taboo strengthens, we will see an 
increase in instances of state brinkmanship behavior and crisis escalation. In order to compare 
the relative effect of the nuclear taboo paradox across time, I use the dispute covered in the first 
case as my baseline measurement of relative incidence of brinkmanship tactics for the nuclear 
era. In each subsequent case, I perform the same measure on each dispute and then compare the 
frequency and intensity of the escalatory processes and brinkmanship tactics employed. If 
Hypothesis 1 is correct, we should expect to see an increase in the incidence of escalation and 
brinkmanship tactics, both across cases and within individual disputes themselves. To falsify my 
hypothesis, we would expect to see no change or even fewer instances of brinkmanship tactics 
and conflict escalation.  
At this point, a distinction between conflict escalation and brinkmanship tactics needs to 
be made. On its own, conflict escalation refers to an increase in the intensity of a specific 
conflict. Lacking other constraints or qualifiers, states may choose to escalate a crisis or dispute 
for two reasons. In the first case, states choose to escalate a dispute because the issue of dispute 
is regarded as politically salient enough to warrant an escalated response from a cost-benefit 
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perspective.53 In other words, State A may choose to escalate a dispute with State B because is 
strategically beneficial to do so for State A. In the second case, states may choose to escalate a 
dispute to higher levels of conflict as a means to demonstrate political resolve, even if that 
resolve is a political bluff employed to assist State A in extracting additional concessions out of 
State B. Under this scenario, states choose to escalate conflict because it may be tactically 
beneficial to do so, even if actual conflict escalation may not be in State A’s long-term strategic 
interests. The classic example of such brinkmanship is Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—elites in 
Japan hoped that by escalating the intensifying conflict in the Pacific with a significant pre-
emptive strike, the United States would lose the resolve to fight back.54 Such tactics of escalation 
are properly termed brinkmanship, particularly when employed as a threat to escalate a conflict 
past a “tipping point.” 
For the purposes of this study, I test escalation and brinkmanship behavior with a 
process-tracing approach. Because escalation and brinkmanship tactics are highly contextual, I 
analyze the overall impact, or lack thereof, of the nuclear taboo paradox on escalation processes. 
From a qualitative approach, if Hypothesis 1 is correct, we would expect to see an increase in 
elite decision-maker discussion focused on demonstrating resolve, taking a hard-line stance, 
bluffing, and the relative costs and benefits of escalation versus the value of the outcome of the 
dispute. If Hypothesis 1 is false, we would expect to see no change or even a decrease in the 
relative incidence of such discussions. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
53 Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation,” 
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54 Richard N. Lebow, “Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining,” European Journal of 
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Variable Operationalization—Measuring Conflict Severity 
 
 Hypothesis 2 centers on specifying changes in conflict itself because of nuclear weapons. 
As I have previously discussed, the destabilizing loss in nuclear credibility due to a strengthening 
nuclear taboo theoretically should make both nuclear and non-nuclear states alike bolder when 
disputing with nuclear states. From this, I derived Hypothesis 2, designed to look at outcomes 
where Hypothesis 1 examined processes. For this hypothesis, I examine the intensity of the 
conflict itself, rather than the escalatory processes or brinkmanship tactics that lead up to it. 
Because of the paradoxical nature of the taboo and the rationalist dictates of nuclear deterrence 
and MAD, we should still expect most conflict to stop short of major war. However, all else 
being equal, we should see more intense low- and medium-intensity conflict as the nuclear taboo 
exerts increasing influence in the international system. 
Because conflict severity, like brinkmanship, is difficult to quantify out of context, I 
again employ a qualitative approach to analyze the nuclear taboo’s effect, if any, on the overall 
severity of conflict in order to test Hypothesis 2. As with Hypothesis 1, it is critical to analyze 
trends longitudinally to trace out the specific impact of the nuclear taboo paradox, so again I use 
my first case both as evidence for the presence of the taboo and as a baseline to measure 
subsequent cases against. Because not all conflicts are directly comparable in terms of severity 
on objective metrics, I will conduct a counterfactual analysis of each conflict to determine where 
each case falls on a relative scale of conflict severity based on all possible conflict outcomes. 
The results of this analysis in each case will then be applied longitudinally against one another to 
test my second hypothesis. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, we would expect to see disputes become 
increasingly severe as the nuclear taboo strengthens throughout the twentieth century. If we see 
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either no change or a decrease in the relative severity of conflict across cases, then Hypothesis 2 
will be falsified. 
 
Case Selection: Challenges to Containment 
 
 With the nuclear taboo and measures for my hypotheses operationalized, the final step in 
the research design is case selection. There are several crucial criteria that any case selected must 
meet to properly test the nuclear taboo paradox over time. First, in order to capture the full 
destabilizing effect of the nuclear taboo vis-à-vis the principles of nuclear deterrence and MAD, 
the ideal case will have at least one state in possession of nuclear weapons for a significant 
portion of the nuclear era. This criterion provides us not only with more time on which to draw 
more disputes and conflicts out of, but also allows us to distinguish distinct phases in the 
development of the taboo as it grows stronger over time. A longitudinal study of one dyad, rather 
than several dyads on narrower time scales, is also a superior design, as it allows for controls for 
possible intervening variables such as regime type, pre-existing rivalries, and geography. 
 The obvious case for these criteria is a longitudinal study of the United States-Soviet 
Union dyad from 1945 until 1989. This is in fact the only possible dyad available to 
longitudinally study the nuclear taboo over the entire course of its existence, from the first 
detonation of a nuclear weapon in combat at Hiroshima in 1945 until a relatively contemporary 
date. From 1949 onwards, it also provides us with a nuclear-nuclear dyad, permitting us to 
examine the impact of the nuclear taboo on both sides of the dispute, consequently doubling the 
amount of data available in each case. In order to longitudinally analyze this dyad, I split the 
Cold War into three periods, according to fairly conventional historical divisions of the post-
WWII interstate system. Within each of these periods, I analyze one significant conflict or 
dispute for evidence of the nuclear taboo paradox and my hypotheses. As a control variable, I 
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select cases on the criteria that they feature Soviet attempts to challenge the U.S. policy of 
containment. 
 The first period of the Cold War is typically demarcated from 1945-1953, or, in event 
terms, from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings through the detonation of the first hydrogen 
bombs. This period is dominated by a U.S. nuclear monopoly from 1945-1949, when the United 
States was the only state in possession of the technology required to construct and deploy nuclear 
weapons against an enemy target. Following the Soviet detonation of a test nuclear weapon in 
August 1949, the period continued to be typified by a state of unstable nuclear tensions. As a 
representative conflict of the period, I examine the Korean War from 1950-1953, which featured 
the Soviet Union seeking to challenge U.S. commitment to containing Communism on the 
Korean peninsula through proxy warfare. 
 The second period of the Cold War features between 1953 and 1962, or, again in event 
terms, from the detonation of the first hydrogen bombs through the Cuban Missile Crisis. This 
period was characterized by a situation often designated as “unstable MAD,” where both 
superpowers sought to out-spend and out-produce the other in an attempt to attain a position of 
nuclear superiority while in the interim refraining from engaging in direct conflict for fear of 
nuclear annihilation. It is during this period that we see most states aligning to one side of the 
Cold War or the other. As a representative case of the period, I examine the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, which featured a Soviet challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and containment in the 
Caribbean and Latin America.  
 The final period of the Cold War took place from 1962-1989, or the end of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis through the collapse of the Soviet Union. This period is marked by a rough 
strategic parity of nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, 
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much of this period is characterized by détente, or a relaxation in the relations between the two 
superpowers. Toward the end of the 1970s, however, Western policy toward the Eastern bloc 
began to shift away from détente to a more confrontational posture. With this more aggressive 
posture came a renewed nuclear arms race, as well as the first true attempts at the development 
of a comprehensive Strategic Defense Initiative in the United States as a means to unsettle the 
balance of MAD. While the latter part of this period saw a decline in Soviet adventurism abroad 
as it turned inward to deal with growing domestic problems that would ultimately lead to its 
1991 collapse, the first half of this period saw a significant increase in challenges to U.S. 
containment in Central Asia and Africa. For my final case study, I will analyze the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I argued that the nuclear taboo provides substantial explanatory power in 
understanding the nuclear non-use phenomenon, but that research into the impact of the taboo to 
date has been relatively one-sided. In my literature review, I identified a substantial gap in the 
research program pertaining to possible destabilizing consequences of the nuclear taboo. In the 
theory component of this chapter, I outlined a theory of the nuclear taboo similar to the nuclear 
stability-instability paradox, where the nuclear taboo can simultaneously have stabilizing and 
destabilizing effects on the interstate system. This logic, which I term the nuclear taboo paradox, 
suggests that as the nuclear taboo increases in normative strength, states will be more inclined to 
disregard nuclear threats and deterrents in their strategic calculations. To test this logic, I 
developed a qualitative research methodology designed on two hypotheses pertaining to 
brinkmanship tactics and severity of conflict through a longitudinal case study of the U.S.-Soviet 
dyad from 1945 to 1989. The following three chapters contain the results of these case studies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953 
 Following nearly two years of fighting over scraps of territory along the 38th parallel, 
United Nations forces and the communists finally brought major theater operations of the Korean 
War to a close on July 27, 1953.55 While much territory exchanged hands multiple times in the 
opening months of the war, in the end the armistice line was declared almost exactly in 
accordance with the original boundaries between North and South Korea. The Korean conflict 
represented many firsts for the Cold War. It was the first time the Cold War turned hot with 
proxy warfare between the United States and communists in Russia and China. The Korean War 
was also the first instance of deliberately limited war in an era previously typified by total war. It 
was additionally the first major conflict in which a combatant had nuclear weapons from the start 
and, as a consequence, was also the first conflict in which elites opted not to use such weapons in 
a military capacity. As such, Korea is the ideal first case to establish a baseline for the impact of 
the nuclear taboo paradox.  
 Before delving into the actual case study, however, it is important to outline precisely 
what the nuclear taboo paradox would predict in such a scenario. Traditional nuclear taboo 
theory contends that even at this early date a weak taboo was in effect and exerted some 
influence over nuclear decision makers. With a weak nuclear taboo in place, we should then 
expect a few instances of brinkmanship, albeit ones concerned and tempered by the possible 
consequences of actual escalation. We predict this because although a weak taboo exists during 
this period, the overarching strategic paradigm remains a balance-of-power one. As a 
                                               
55Although an armistice and cease-fire were signed by both sides on this date, no formal peace instrument has ever 
been signed. Technically then, the two Koreas remain at war, as evidenced by sporadic fighting along the 
Demilitarized Zone. Edward A. Olsen, “The United States’ Role in the Korean Peace Regime Building Process,” in 
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security Cooperation, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak 
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consequence, policymakers ought to still accept the nuclear threat as a plausible outcome. In the 
instances that we do see brinkmanship behavior, however, this balance-of-power mentality 
should be moderated by a sense of weakened credibility, specifically predicated on notions of 
reputation costs, morality, or domestic public disapproval. 
 In this chapter, I argue that the Korean War case follows the logic of the nuclear taboo 
paradox and is best explained with this theory. Destabilizing elements of the nuclear taboo 
paradox in the form of increased brinkmanship and escalatory behavior do not occur with much 
frequency—to the contrary, elites deliberately and actively sought ways to prevent the conflict 
from spiraling into a wider war as they continued to situate most of their strategic thinking in 
traditional balance-of-power terms. However, when such behavior did occur, elites exhibited 
thinking consistent with concerns about the nuclear taboo. 
This chapter is divided into two major sections. First, I present a brief historical overview 
of the Korean War to situate the case chronologically and provide context for specific instances 
of brinkmanship. Second, I look for evidence of brinkmanship behavior and escalatory tactics, on 
the part of both the United States and the communists. Having established instances of such 
tactics, I then examine how these empirics compare to the predictions of two competing 
explanations—the nuclear stability-instability paradox and nuclear deterrence—as well as 
traditional nuclear taboo theory and finally my own theory of the nuclear taboo paradox. I 
conclude this chapter with a summary of the overall empirical support for my theory from this 
case. 
 
Historical Overview 
 
 Following the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from the peninsula in 1949, border 
skirmishes and guerilla raids quickly became the norm for both North and South Korea as both 
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polities harassed ideological opposition leaders in their respective territories.56 It was not until 
April of 1950, however, when Kim Il-Sung travelled first to Moscow and later to Beijing to 
secure Stalin’s and Mao’s support for an invasion of reunification, that plans for a wider war 
began to be put into motion. Stalin had indicated abstract support for such an effort as early as 
January 1950, but declined to provide Kim Il-Sung with troops for fear of sparking a larger war 
with the United States and its NATO allies.57 Instead, Stalin sent Kim to Mao, who despite being 
in the midst of demobilizing much of the People’s Liberation Army offered Kim both materiel 
and manpower. A month later, on June 25, 1950, North Korean armies crossed the 38th parallel 
under the guise of a counterattack to South Korean military provocations.58 
 The immediate U.S. reaction was one of surprise—very little intelligence had suggested 
an imminent attack, and unlike for Japan, no defense plans existed for South Korea.59 The 
Truman administration’s decision to intervene in the conflict with ground troops came only after 
lengthy internal debate weighing the necessity of a non-hostile Korea to Japan’s defense versus 
the risk of the war escalating with the Soviet Union.60 On June 25th, 1950, the United States led 
the United Nations Security Council in a unanimous resolution of condemnation of the North 
Korean invasion.61 Within a week, the United States began mobilizing forces stationed in Japan 
onto the Korean peninsula. 
                                               
56 I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952], 47. 
57 Steven Hugh Lee, Seminar Studies in History: The Korean War [London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001], 41. 
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Press, 1999], 33. 
59 Stone, Hidden History, 59. 
60 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 1:85. 
61 This vote was made possible because the Soviet Union had been boycotting its Security Council seat since 
January 13, 1950 in protest of the United Nations’ refusal to unseat the Nationalist Chinese delegation after that 
government had fallen to Communist forces. Had the Soviet Union returned to its seat, Resolution 82 surely would 
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Kansas, 1977], 190. 
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 In the opening weeks of the conflict, however, U.S. and allied reinforcements could not 
arrive quickly enough to support the ill-equipped and under-trained South Korean army as the 
superior North Korean forces pushed southward with their Soviet-built tanks and aircraft.62 By 
September, the South Korean army had been driven behind the Pusan perimeter.63 American 
forces were eventually able to hold off further North Korean advances at this line and began to 
seriously deplete enemy tank and personnel numbers, halting and reversing the North Korean 
advance. 64 With the victory at the Battle of Inchon in September, U.N. forces finally broke 
through the line and began re-capturing territory steadily northward toward the 38th parallel.65 
 As U.N. and South Korean forces marched northward, the question of crossing the 38th 
parallel and attempting a counter-invasion for reunification weighed on the minds of both sides. 
Truman, still seeking to avoid an escalation of the war to include the Soviet Union, directed 
General MacArthur through a National Security Council memorandum to operate north of the 
38th parallel if “at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major 
Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to 
counter our operations militarily…”66 Later, as it was more and more presumed that the Soviet 
Union would continue to refrain from contributing ground forces, these orders were updated in 
late September by Secretary of Defense George Marshall, who authorized General MacArthur to 
proceed north of the parallel.67 Foreseeing such a move, on September 30th Chinese military 
commander Zhou Enlai threatened major Chinese intervention if the United States crossed the 
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border.68 A plan was enacted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that only South Korean forces would 
proceed north of the parallel to forestall any accusations of imperialistic occupation by the 
communists or their sympathizers. General MacArthur would disregard the constraints of this 
plan several days later in early October when he elected to proceed northward with U.N. forces.69 
 The same day as U.N. forces cross the 38th parallel, Soviet leaders requested that the 
Chinese deploy five to six divisions to Korea to support the North Korean regime.70 Internal 
debate raged within the Chinese Politburo for several days, suggesting that the original threat to 
intervene was not fully credible at the time it was made, but ultimately Mao’s pro-intervention 
position won out and three divisions were dispatched to North Korea.71 These new 
reinforcements quickly crossed the Yalu River separating China and North Korea and 
participated in their first engagements in late October 1950. General MacArthur chose to press 
on rather than consolidate his forces at the neck of the peninsula, a disastrous decision that led to 
the Second Phase Offensive, where the Chinese ambushed the US X Corps and 8th Army.72 The 
resulting U.S. retreat from northwest Korea would be the longest in U.S. history, leaving U.N. 
allied forces south of Seoul by January 4th, 1951.73 
Following the relief of General MacArthur and the assumption of supreme command of 
U.S. and allied forces in Korea by General Ridgeway in April 1951, U.N. forces were able to 
repel Communist forces—now operating with Soviet air force support—to a line just north of the 
38th parallel.74 Some territory exchanged sides for several more months between the 38th parallel 
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and Seoul, but eventually the conflict stabilized around the 38th parallel itself.75 In July 1951, 
armistice negotiations were called for by both sides while trench and air warfare continued. 
Peace negotiations were an on-again, off-again affair for the next two years, as both sides 
attempted to demonstrate their resolve to continue fighting while privately acknowledging that 
neither side was likely to achieve additional military success in the short-run.76 Finding a 
resolution to the Korean conflict became a major campaign issue in the 1952 U.S. election and 
was partially responsible for Dwight D. Eisenhower’s win.77 With the help of third-party 
negotiations with India and possibly with the suggestion that the new Eisenhower administration 
was prepared to expand the war with nuclear weapons should an ceasefire not be reached, the 
Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27th, 1953.78 No formal peace treaty was ever 
concluded and is technically considered active to the present day, but the preponderance of 
military operations—and all of those involving the United States—concluded with the signing of 
the Armistice Agreement. 
 
Examining the Evidence: Chinese Intervention 
 
 With the case now detailed from a historical perspective, we can now examine it for 
evidence of the nuclear taboo paradox and my hypotheses. To do this, we must answer two 
questions—first, do we see instances of brinkmanship in the conflict, and second, if we do, are 
they best explained from my theoretical perspective or an alternative one, such as standard 
nuclear stability-instability theory or deterrence theory? This section of the chapter will address 
each question in turn. Since severity of conflict is intrinsically a comparative measure, 
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Hypothesis 2—which predicts more severe low- and mid-level conflict as the strength of the 
nuclear taboo increases—cannot be measured on this single case alone, but rather between cases. 
 As I suggested in the opening section of this chapter, there is very little evidence of 
brinkmanship behavior by either the United States or the Soviet Union-led communist forces 
during the Korean War. To the contrary, both sides went to great lengths to ensure that the 
conflict did not unintentionally escalate to a wider war between superpowers so soon after 
WWII. Some contemporary scholars have even gone so far as to criticize the Truman 
administration for not being willing to escalate the conflict when the facts on the ground would 
have seemed to indicate that it would have been militarily and politically expedient to do so and 
end the war on more favorable terms.79 
This cautious behavior is in accordance with the predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox, 
which suggest that brinkmanship behavior increases over time as the nuclear taboo becomes 
more robust—at this point the nuclear taboo was still just emerging. As a result, we could expect 
the nuclear taboo to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but that it wouldn’t be strong enough to 
lead to a significant amount of brinkmanship behavior. Before arriving fully at this conclusion, 
however, we must trace the casual logic of the theory through the case, as well as through 
competing explanations. 
 The first case of brinkmanship behavior we see during the Korean War comes from the 
Chinese on September 30th, 1950. As General MacArthur and his allied forces moved northward 
toward the 38th parallel, Chinese military commander Zhou Enlai threatened major Chinese 
intervention if the United States crossed the border.80 This threatened action would greatly 
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escalate the war, which at the time had seen only materiel support to the North Koreans from 
China and the Soviet Union. 
While the Chinese ultimately did follow through on this threat and entered the conflict at 
the Yalu River, the existing historical record is unclear as to whether this specific case was in 
fact a credible escalatory threat or an example of brinkmanship employed in an attempt to stop 
the U.S. advance at the time it was conveyed to U.S. officials.81 It is clear that the Truman 
administration considered it a bluff, as no senior official publically rebuked General MacArthur 
for his unauthorized Home-By-Christmas Offensive or attempted to halt what appeared to be a 
successful forward advance north of the parallel.82 
The actual Chinese position is fuzzier, however. What is clear is that the Soviet Union 
originally requested that the Chinese be ready to mobilize several divisions of ground forces 
should the United States move northward, which serves as the original basis for Zhou Enlai’s 
admonition to the United States.83 It has also been documented that several significant players in 
the Chinese Politburo felt that the United States was a paper tiger and would halt its progress 
under the threat of a wider war.84 Others were more skeptical, however, and when the allied 
forces ignored the threat and crossed the parallel into North Korea, several days were spent in 
heated debate over what course of action China should actually take.85 The decision was 
ultimately made to militarily support the North Koreans at Mao’s insistence, but in smaller 
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numbers than the Soviet Union originally directed, suggesting that China perhaps had not been 
fully prepared to mobilize into the war at the time of Zhou Enlai’s threat.86 
 
The Realist Perspective: Deterrence & Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
 Before we examine how the empirical evidence of this case matches with the logic of the 
nuclear taboo paradox, let us turn to the predictions of the competing realist arguments: rational 
deterrence and the nuclear stability-instability paradox. While the two theories diverge in their 
predictions for dyads in which both states possess nuclear weapons, for cases where only one 
state has deployable nuclear weapons capabilities their expectations are the same.87 For both 
theories in such a world, we should expect to see the nuclear power freely engage in escalation 
and threats to escalate conflict up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. This is because in 
lacking an opposing state with nuclear weapons capabilities, there is no commensurate level of 
retaliatory damage that could be threatened—whether implicitly or explicitly—to deter the 
former state from utilizing such weapons when it finds it strategically advantageous to do so. 
Likewise, because the rival state lacks nuclear weapons capabilities, we should see the opposing 
non-nuclear state refrain from escalating conflict and in general avoiding military adventures 
infringing on the foreign policy interests of the nuclear state. 
 Specifically for the Korea case, then, we should expect to see the United States engaging 
in increasingly aggressive military adventures in Korea and a Communist bloc effectively 
deterred by the United States’ nuclear status if either rational deterrence or the nuclear stability-
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instability paradox is the driving causal factor in the conflict. This would be the case because the 
United States retained a de facto monopoly on nuclear weapons through 1953, when the conflict 
ended.88 With no other state in possession of deployable nuclear weapons at the time, the United 
States should have felt free to pursue conventional military adventures as it desired, safe in the 
knowledge that the communist states would not escalate the dispute to major war. Should 
policymakers have found it strategically advantageous to do so, we should also see actual use of 
nuclear weapons in conflict in such a world. 
 Under this realist perspective, the United States generally acted in accordance with our 
predictions, although not always to the fullest extent anticipated. With the war effort in Korea 
finally turned in the United States’ favor and backed with an implicit nuclear trump card, 
policymakers had every assurance that the Communist bloc states would not militarily intervene 
if the allied forces progressed north of the 38th parallel in a bid to reunite the peninsula under the 
South Korean government. Indeed, on the U.S. side of this incident, the only point that is 
surprising under the realist theories is that the United States did not take more advantage of its de 
facto nuclear monopoly. Specifically, under the full causal logic of these models, we should see 
much more aggressive behavior on the part of the United States, rather than the extensive 
internal debate on the question of crossing the 38th parallel.89 Furthermore, it is surprising that 
the United States did not fully leverage its nuclear advantage by making the nuclear threat more 
explicit to the Communist bloc states. 
The Chinese threat to escalate the conflict with direct military intervention and the events 
leading up to it, however, are fundamentally at odds with these predictions. Although Korea was 
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seen as an important step toward spreading communism throughout East Asia, it was not an 
existential foreign policy issue for China or the Soviet Union. Faced with an opponent that could 
potentially retaliate with nuclear weapons, the communists should have been much more 
reluctant to intervene in such a manner so as to place them in direct military confrontation with 
the United States under our realist models. Instead, we see China as the more aggressive party in 
this episode and in the Korean case more broadly. The only scenario under which this outcome 
could operate under rational deterrence or the stability-instability paradox would be if the 
communists had perfect information that there was no possible circumstance under which the 
United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons, but such knowledge runs contrary to the 
basic assumptions of those same models. For this sub-case then, we must conclude that the 
realist models fail to provide adequate explanation for the Chinese intervention. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo Perspective: The Traditional Logic 
 
Turning now to norms-based logics, we will next consider the predictions of traditional 
nuclear taboo theory before proceeding on to an analysis of the case through the lens of the 
nuclear taboo paradox. Generally speaking, taboo theory posits that nuclear states will refrain 
from using nuclear weapons because the international community, domestic publics, and 
individual leaders find them immoral, inhumane, or otherwise in some way distinct from 
conventional weapons.90 This applies whether a particular dyad has one, two, or no states that 
possess nuclear weapons—the impact of the taboo is a function of its strength in a given state 
and the international community, rather than a product of any material differences between 
states. In a world with a weak nuclear taboo, then, we should expect to see states broadly 
continuing to act as if still operating under pure balance-of-forces logic. However, as a conflict 
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escalates toward the use of nuclear weapons, we should expect to see elite decision makers 
discuss the reputation costs, morality, and public response inherent to such a decision and 
ultimately decide against deploying their nuclear weapons regardless of their strategic or tactical 
utility. 
For the Korea case, the nuclear taboo applies most pertinently to U.S. decision-makers. 
With a weak nuclear taboo in place, extended discussion about the deployment of nuclear 
weapons would be expected from U.S. policymakers. However, the end result ought to be a 
negative decision, specifically one justified through the normative and moral characteristics of 
the taboo detailed above. Nuclear taboo theory does not make specific predictions about Chinese 
behavior in this case, as the state did not yet possess nuclear weapons. 
Looking at the Chinese intervention through this lens then, the nuclear taboo on its own 
does not provide us with much explanatory value. The use of nuclear weapons was not discussed 
extensively at this point in the conflict, so it cannot tell us much about the U.S. reaction to the 
Chinese intervention threat. Lacking any predictions about non-nuclear states’ behavior in 
response to awareness of the nuclear taboo’s effect on nuclear states, traditional nuclear taboo 
theory also fails to explain the Chinese decision to threaten and later execute a direct military 
intervention against the United States and U.N. allied forces as they crossed the 38th parallel. As 
we will see in the following section, it is specifically this lack of predictive power that is 
remedied by the theoretical modifications of the nuclear taboo paradox. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo Paradox Perspective 
 
Moving to consideration of my own theory, recall that the nuclear taboo paradox predicts 
that as the nuclear taboo increases in strength, brinkmanship and more intense low-level conflict 
will also increase. For a weak nuclear taboo then, we would expect to see much the same 
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outcome as the traditional nuclear taboo perspective in that see states should broadly continue to 
act as if still operating under pure balance-of-power logic up until the point of consideration for 
the use of nuclear weapons is reached. At that point, we should expect to see elite decision-
makers discuss the reputation costs, morality, and public response inherent to such a decision and 
ultimately decide against deploying their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, we should expect rival 
states to begin exhibiting less concern for any implicit or explicit nuclear threat, specifically with 
elite language suggesting doubt at the credibility of such a threat because of those same 
normative factors discussed by nuclear decision-makers. This doubt in the nuclear deterrent 
should then manifest itself in a greater proclivity to engage in brinkmanship behavior. 
Empirically, if the nuclear taboo paradox is correct, it then follows that we would expect 
to see only low levels of brinkmanship during the Korean War, all else being equal, because the 
nuclear taboo was still emergent between the years 1950-1953. The weakness of the taboo is 
evidenced by the insistence of many senior military and political leaders that the United States 
could still use nuclear weapons like any other weapon.91 However, in the final aggregate we 
should expect to see U.S. decision-makers choosing not to utilize nuclear weapons on normative 
grounds. On the communist side of the conflict, we should expect to see a greater willingness to 
engage in brinkmanship behavior than would be expected under a realist world; again however, 
this decision should likely only come after extensive internal debate among elite decision-makers 
as they attempt to grapple with the strategic consequences of an emergent nuclear taboo. 
 As with the traditional nuclear taboo lens, U.S. behavior during this instance of 
brinkmanship falls outside of the scope of the theory, as the use of nuclear weapons was not 
extensively discussed at this point in the conflict. Chinese behavior, however, was very much in 
line with our predictions. While it remains unclear whether the Chinese meant their September 
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30th threat to the United States as a credible deterrent or political bluff, it is clear that it was a 
case of brinkmanship.92 Specifically, this brinkmanship was informed by the willingness of some 
in the Chinese Politburo to escalate the conflict with the United States if necessary, a stance that 
was informed at least in part by perceptions of the likelihood of U.S. retaliation. Documentary 
evidence of Politburo meetings from September 1950 supports the notion that some Chinese 
leaders doubted the likelihood of a U.S. nuclear response or expansion of the war into China 
itself, labeling the United States instead a “paper tiger” that maintained its global power position 
with “the lying theory of the new omnipotent weapon…to bluff, threaten, and scare others.”93 
Coupled with the U.S. administration’s proclaimed goal to keep the conflict confined to the 
peninsula, this would have been positive evidence to support Chinese opinions questioning U.S. 
willingness to use the atomic bomb—in other words, the nuclear taboo. The fierce internal 
debate following the U.S. disregard of the threat indicates that there was by no means complete 
agreement on this question with the Politburo, an outcome also in line with the predictions of the 
nuclear taboo paradox. 
 
Examining the Evidence: Expanding the War to End the War 
The second incident of brinkmanship during the Korean conflict is situated toward the 
end of the conflict as the United States sought to find a way to extract itself from the war. 
Following President Eisenhower’s election in 1952 and his subsequent tour of Korea as he 
readied himself to take over the presidency, he convened a series of meetings with his national 
security advisors to determine a course of action that would resolve the conflict.94 One of the key 
                                               
92 We recall here that the critical distinction between escalation and brinkmanship is that in the former case a state 
finds it militarily advantageous to increase the severity of a conflict, while in the latter case a state increases the 
severity of a conflict as a means to convey political resolve to its opponent. 
93 Chih-Yu, China’s Just World. 
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concerns, as it had been for the Truman administration, was that the war would spread to China 
or the Soviet Union should the stalled peace negotiations break down. Furthermore, the 
Eisenhower administration was concerned about the rising cost of the war and the domestic 
budget, which had been major issues during the presidential campaign. 
Looking to extract the United States from the conflict as quickly and cheaply as possible, 
Eisenhower and his national security advisors spent a great deal of time contemplating the threat 
and possible use of nuclear weapons against China and North Korea should the peace talks fail. 
It is well documented in the historical and international relations literatures that these discussions 
consumed a good deal of time at these meetings, but available records are unclear as to whether 
they were merely academic in nature or were acted upon, either as contingency plans or as actual 
threats to the Communists to encourage continued talks.95 Some scholars believe that such 
threats may have been conveyed at least to several U.S. allies, while others argue that such 
discussions were never implemented, but, if they had been, likely would have been in the form of 
brinkmanship rather than an actual intention to escalate the conflict to nuclear war.96 This 
conclusion comes on the heels of revisionist scholarship in recent years that suggests that the 
Eisenhower administration was not nearly as eager to use nuclear weapons as has been 
previously thought.97 
 
The Realist Perspective: Deterrence & Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
Following the same model as before, we will first examine the realist alternatives to my 
theory before proceeding on to a discussion of traditional taboo theory and the nuclear taboo 
paradox. As was true for the first sub-case, the realist explanations of rational deterrence and the 
                                               
95 Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans [Boston: South End 
Press, 1986]. 
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nuclear stability-instability paradox both predict the same thing in a world where the United 
States has a de facto monopoly on nuclear weapons. If a realist alternative theory is correct, we 
should expect to see the sole nuclear power freely engage in escalation and threats to escalate 
conflict up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, we should expect to see the 
non-nuclear state, which has no capabilities with which to threaten commensurate damage to 
deter a nuclear strike, should avoid escalating conflict on non-existential issues whenever 
possible to protect its material interests. 
For this second sub-case, empirically we should be focused on the behavior of the United 
States. If the realist alternative theories are correct, we should expect to see the United States use 
its nuclear weapons capabilities to freely escalate or threaten to escalate the Korean conflict as a 
means to achieve strategic objectives. Specifically, deterrence theory and the nuclear stability-
instability paradox would predict that the United States would use the threat of expanded war 
and nuclear weapons to prevent the communists from resuming and expanding the war as peace 
negotiations stalled. If such a threat is made as predicted, we would then also expect the 
Communist bloc to rationally consider the escalatory threat and accordingly acquiesce to U.S. 
demands. 
If the Eisenhower administration was actually prepared to threaten nuclear escalation to 
keep the Communist front from breaking off peace negotiations and expanding the war, this 
would be in line with our alternative model predictions. The presence of nuclear weapons in the 
U.S. military arsenal should have provided U.S. elites with a sense of a superior negotiating 
position with such a threat, as they would have known that the communists would not be willing 
to risk national devastation for a third-country foreign policy dispute. However, the logics of 
these models would suggest that the most effective form of deterrence in this scenario would 
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require the Eisenhower administration to make the nuclear threat explicit so that it could not be 
misinterpreted.98 As I have already discussed, the historical record is not clear that the 
discussions concerning nuclear escalation with China ever resulted in any explicit threats. While 
it remains possible that it was in some capacity, which would lend some support to the rational 
deterrence logic, it certainly was not made in an unambiguous manner that would make the cost-
benefit calculations very obvious for the Chinese. In fact, operating under the casual logic of 
these models, it is surprising that we do not see more such instances throughout the conflict. As a 
result, we can conclude that realist predictions provide a minimally acceptable explanation for 
this sub-case, although not a robust one, and certainly fail to explain the otherwise lacking 
incidence of nuclear threats by the United States. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo Perspective: The Traditional Logic 
 
Returning to more normative approaches, let us now examine this sub-case from the lens 
of the traditional nuclear taboo model. Even by the end of the Korean War, traditional nuclear 
taboo theory only posits a weak nuclear taboo. As such, we should expect to see nuclear states 
advocating the use of nuclear weapons in very traditional balance-of-forces terms, but ultimately 
choosing not to for reasons of morality or public opinion. Non-nuclear states should not be 
particularly impacted by the nuclear taboo, since traditional taboo theory does not say anything 
predictive about the behavior of such states. 
In this particular case, under the logic of the traditional nuclear taboo we should expect to 
see a nuclear United States frequently discussing the possible use of nuclear weapons for 
strategic and tactical aims in the war. As decisions are made, however, we would expect 
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policymakers to ultimately opt not to utilize the weapons, primarily citing public disapproval or 
moral concerns for their decision. 
The U.S. escalatory threat sub-case follows these predictions as outlined. President 
Eisenhower met with his new security advisors prior to and immediately after being inaugurated 
president to develop a solution that would extract the United States from the conflict cheaply and 
effectively. By all accounts all options, including nuclear weapons, were re-visited and re-
examined at length.99 For a time it seemed like the administration had decided to threaten the use 
of nuclear weapons should the Chinese continue to stalemate on the ceasefire issue. However, no 
threat was ever publically communicated by Eisenhower or members of his administration and 
the record remains incomplete as to whether it was ever communicated even in private to U.S. 
allies. While this sub-case lacks the “smoking gun” dialogue indicting the nuclear taboo as a 
reason to not proceed with the threat, evidence elsewhere is highly indicative of the fact that 
Eisenhower and his security advisors were extremely cognizant of the emerging nuclear taboo 
and struggled to reconcile their traditional balance-of-forces worldview with the new normative 
constraint on the United States’ most powerful weapon.100 As a consequence, we must conclude 
that this particular sub-case provides empirical support for the traditional nuclear taboo model. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo Paradox Perspective 
 
Turning to our final theoretical lens, we will now examine this sub-case in comparison to 
the behavior predicted under the nuclear taboo paradox. Recall that the nuclear taboo paradox 
begins with the theoretical predictions of the standard traditional taboo, then extends this logic to 
the other states involved in the conflict. In a system where the nuclear taboo still remains weak, 
we should expect to see elite-level dialogue initially expressing a strategic or tactical desire to 
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use nuclear weapons. However, we should ultimately see decisions being made to not use 
nuclear weapons on moral or humanitarian grounds. On the rival, non-nuclear side of the 
conflict, we should see states still concerned about the nuclear deterrent, but also less than fully 
convinced of the credibility of a nuclear response to a conventional military action. 
This second case of brinkmanship provides less support for the nuclear taboo paradox 
than the first, but still can be explained under the logic. As has been previously discussed, it is 
still unclear whether the Eisenhower administration ever made the threat of nuclear escalation 
fully explicit to the communists. If it was, this behavior would certainly be an example of a 
threat to escalate a conflict to achieve a political goal—in this case, to keep the communists at 
the negotiating table. However, brinkmanship behavior in and of itself does not specifically 
provide evidence for the destabilizing evidence of the nuclear taboo paradox; the critical 
component of the theory is the rationale behind the brinkmanship, i.e. the presumption that rival 
states will not resort to nuclear retaliation because of the nuclear taboo. While the Soviet Union 
had acquired the atomic bomb by this point, it lacked both the quantities and deployment 
capabilities to use them in Korea.101 As such, concerns about a Soviet nuclear response to the 
proposed U.S. threat to escalate were not a significant factor in these discussions. Therefore, 
while this is certainly a possible case of brinkmanship during the Korean War, it is not clear that 
the nuclear taboo paradox was the primary casual factor at play in elite-level decision-making. 
At best, we can declare this sub-case ambiguous with regard to the available evidence, with a 
nod toward the nuclear taboo paradox because of the failure of the rationalist models to provide a 
suitable alternative explanation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I argued that a nascent nuclear taboo had a small, yet measurable impact 
on the conduct of the Korean War. This is in accordance with my theory, which predicted a low 
level of brinkmanship conduct driven by taboo-based considerations. As the emerging nuclear 
taboo had yet to be fully engrained in the public and elite consciousnesses, fewer of the 
destabilizing consequences I predict for cases when the nuclear taboo is stronger resulted. Even 
at such a weak level, however, it is clear that the emergent taboo had an operative effect of elite-
level decision-making. 
Tracing the logic of the nuclear taboo paradox through the instances of identified 
brinkmanship specifically, I found that they provided strong, though not conclusive, support for 
my theory. For the purpose of comparison, I examined two alternative theories, the nuclear 
stability-instability paradox and rational deterrence, and found that they cannot account for the 
brinkmanship tactics used—or not used—by the combatants. In the following two chapters, I 
examine cases where the nuclear taboo became increasingly stronger, expecting to find a 
significant rise in the frequency and severity of brinkmanship behavior and low-level conflict 
that is much more clearly indicative of this normative paradox at work. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, OCTOBER 1962 
 As the Cold War deepened into the early 1960s, so too did the enmity between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Relations between the Eisenhower administration and the 
competing Soviet leaders who emerged out of the power vacuum left by Stalin’s death in 1953 
for the most part were relatively stable throughout the remainder of the 1950s. However, with the 
nearly concurrent rise of both John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the rivalry between the 
two states threatened to turn hot once more. At the same time, popular distaste for nuclear 
weapons in both states, but especially the United States, had increased to such a degree that it 
was no longer possible for elite decision-makers to ignore. Instead, political and military leaders 
sought to work within and around the growing normative constraints on their actions. To further 
investigate the effects of the nuclear taboo paradox, I have selected the Cuban Missile Crisis 
from this period for two reasons. First, with evidence that the nuclear taboo operated with greater 
and greater effect as the Cold War progressed, the crises of the 1960s are an excellent place to 
examine the increasingly strong impact of the taboo. Second, as a direct challenge to the U.S. 
policy of containment in the Western Hemisphere, the Cuban Missile Crisis meets our 
independent criteria for case selection, providing us with a superb case for analysis. 
 It is important to identify the specific predictions the nuclear taboo paradox makes for the 
time period in question before proceeding to the case. Nuclear taboo scholars generally agree 
that in the post-Korean environment, the effect of the nuclear taboo began to strengthen to such a 
degree that it began to consistently influence elite-level tactical and strategic thinking.102 Under 
                                               
102 This should not be conflated with internalization of the taboo. While elites were internalizing the norm 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, for much of the early part of this period the taboo’s influence was largely a result 
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our model then, we should expect to see a greater frequency and severity of brinkmanship crises 
and tactics, as well as higher levels of conflict—in terms of threatened or actual uses of force. 
We predict this because as the nuclear taboo becomes more entrenched in both domestic and 
international opinion, rival states should feel more confident in pursuing foreign policy 
adventures. This confidence stems from the knowledge that peripheral foreign policy interests 
are not worth the reputation costs to a state that violates the taboo in anything less than an 
existential conflict. 
 In this chapter, I argue that the behavior exhibited during the Cuban Missile Crisis is best 
explained with the logic of the nuclear taboo paradox. As the nuclear taboo increased in strength, 
its destabilizing elements manifested in the form of severe brinkmanship that mirrored and 
amplified similar crises from the same period. The overall level of conflict threatened was also 
more severe than previously seen since the conclusion of WWII as the two superpowers teetered 
on the brink of nuclear war. At the same time, however, elite-level discourse from both sides of 
the conflict indicates that neither side fully believed in the other’s nuclear threats and acted on 
these assumptions—driven in part by awareness of the influence of the nuclear taboo on the 
other—accordingly as they continued to let the conflict escalate. 
This chapter is divided into three principal sections. First, I provide a brief narrative of 
the international events leading up to October 1962, so as to provide context for the sub-cases of 
brinkmanship that follow within the actual Cuban Missile Crisis. In the second section, I look for 
evidence of brinkmanship behavior by both the Soviets and the United States. As before, I 
examine the instances of brinkmanship through the lenses of deterrence theory, the stability-
instability paradox, traditional nuclear taboo theory, and finally the nuclear taboo paradox. Next, 
I move to a comparative analysis of my first two cases in order to test my second hypothesis on 
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the relative severity of conflict. Finally, I conclude this chapter with an overall summary of my 
findings. 
 
Historical Overview 
 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of several high-level disputes between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Corresponding predominantly 
with Eisenhower’s second term and the emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as the successor to 
Joseph Stalin, this was a period of the Cold War typified by proxy warfare and dispute 
escalation. Among the most notable cases from this period are Operation Ajax in Iran, the Suez 
Crisis, and the Berlin Crisis of 1961.103 The Cuban Missile Crisis however stands out during this 
period for two reasons. First, it represents a direct challenge to the U.S. policy of containment 
within the Western Hemisphere and a deliberate Soviet test of the Monroe Doctrine. Second, this 
crisis is widely acknowledged by historians and international relations scholars as the moment 
the world came closest to nuclear war. 
The origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis date back to January 1959, when Fidel Castro 
seized power in Cuba and ended the corrupt dictatorship of General Fulgencio Batista.104 Batista, 
although hardly democratic, had been friendly to the major U.S. economic and military interests 
in Cuba. Many within the State Department and the majority of the American public believed 
that Castro already subscribed to communism at this time and that his revolutionary policies 
would spell national security disaster for U.S. interests in the hemisphere.105 In April 1961, the 
                                               
103 David Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962,” in The Cambridge History 
of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 
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104 Robert Beggs, The Cuban Missile Crisis [London: Longman Group Limited, 1971], 7. 
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CIA led a group of Cuban exiles in the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in an ill-conceived attempt 
to oust Castro without the use of American forces. The invasion failed, dealing a significant blow 
to the new Kennedy administration and hardening both Cuban and Soviet resolve to maintain a 
power presence on the island.106 
The crisis itself began on in April 1962, when U.S. Jupiter missiles became fully 
operational in Turkey. Viewing this as a direct, offensive threat to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev 
decided late that month to deploy Soviet missiles to Cuba as a retaliatory measure.107 Beginning 
in mid-July, U.S. intelligence detected signs of large-scale arms transfers from the Soviet Union 
to Cuba. On October 14, Major Richard Heyser obtained the first photographic evidence of 
Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles in Cuba while flying a U-2 reconnaissance mission.108 
Two days later, following analysis of the photographs, President Kennedy was briefed by 
McGeorge Bundy on the implications of this intelligence and subsequently called together the 
first informal meeting of what would later become known as the Executive Committee of the 
National Security Council, or ExComm.109 President Kennedy continued to meet with the 
ExComm between October 16 and 21, during which time a range of responses were 
considered.110 On October 22, President Kennedy announced in a nationally-televised address 
that the United States would institute a naval quarantine against any and all “offensive military 
equipment” in transit from the Soviet Union to Cuba. Simultaneously, nearly all U.S. military 
                                               
106 Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis [New York: Oxford University Press, 2007], 18. 
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forces worldwide were ordered to raise their alert status to DEFCON 3, while U.S. nuclear forces 
were raised to DEFCON 2.111 
The severity of the U.S. response caught the Soviets by surprise, causing Khrushchev to 
respond via the Soviet news agency TASS with the claim that the Cuban shipments were purely 
“defensive weapons” and denouncing the U.S. deployments. Soviet military officials ordered the 
transport carriers to continue toward the quarantine line. In the meantime, increased U.S. aerial 
reconnaissance of Cuba produced photographic evidence of both Soviet ground forces and a 
number of missile launch sites nearing “full operational capability.”112 U.S. officials concluded 
from this evidence that the Soviets were determined to prevail in the confrontation, leading the 
ExComm to return to developing plans for a full military strike on Cuba. Khrushchev again 
responded in kind with a formal threat on October 27 by withdrawing preliminary proposals to 
deescalate the crisis and demanding that U.S. Jupiter-class missiles in Turkey be removed.113 The 
Kennedy administration ignored this proposal, choosing instead merely to promise to respect the 
sovereignty of Cuba in perpetuity in return for Cuban nuclear disarmament. Khrushchev 
struggled to find an alternative response but ultimately agreed to such a solution based primarily 
on the specter of an imminent U.S. attack on the island on October 28.114 Soviet orders were 
given for the missile transport ships to withdraw from the quarantine line and return home, while 
the Cuban missile sites began to be dismantled. Over the succeeding weeks, the two superpowers 
then slowly backed away from the brink of nuclear war.  
 
                                               
111 The ExComm considered this action, although technically a valid casus belli under international law, as the least 
likely to provoke a Soviet military response. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A 
National Security Archive Documents Reader [New York: The New Press, 1992], 79. 
112 Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy [Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996], 119. 
113 Chang and Kornbluh, Cuban Missile Crisis Reader, 82. 
114 This decision also came with the secret agreement that the United States would remove its own nuclear missiles 
from Southern Italy and Turkey, an arrangement reached through Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin. Ibid. 
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Examining the Evidence: Escalation During the Cuban Missile Crisis 
While the Korean War was a years-long conflict wherein we could identify very concrete 
occurrences of brinkmanship tactics, the Cuban Missile Crisis instead represents a continuous 
escalatory crisis over a very short span of time—just thirteen days. As a consequence, we will 
examine the crisis as one extended instance of brinkmanship and then evaluate the empirical 
evidence in light of my hypotheses and the alternative theories. In this first section, I will 
evaluate Hypothesis 1 concerning the frequency of brinkmanship and escalatory tactics. The 
following section will then feature the first analysis of Hypothesis 2, which predicts more severe 
low- and mid-level conflict as the strength of the nuclear taboo increases. 
Whereas the Korean War was typified by restraint, the Cuban Missile Crisis represents 
the apex of Cold War tensions and escalatory threats. Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union engaged in a series of ever-increasing escalatory threats, each seeking to push the other to 
the brink in order to achieve political victory without sparking an actual nuclear conflict. This is 
suggestive of the nuclear taboo paradox, which predicts that elite decision-makers will engage in 
more frequent and severe brinkmanship behavior in such a period of a moderately robust nuclear 
taboo. While the nuclear taboo was not completely embedded in the international order relative 
to contemporary standards, it was certainly strong enough to significantly influence decision-
making during superpower disputes. To confirm this, however, we must first causally trace the 
events of the case—to evaluate the accuracy of my theory as well as alternative theories. 
The case begins with the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba during the summer of 1962. 
Khrushchev and the Soviet Politburo, alarmed by the U.S. deployment of Jupiter-class nuclear 
missiles in neighboring Turkey and growing gap in strategic nuclear capabilities, sought to 
politically remedy the situation with a direct challenge to the United States’ declaration of an 
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exclusive sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. From the beginning of the crisis, it 
was apparent to both sides that the positioning of several dozen nuclear missiles in Cuba would 
do little to actually alter the strategic balance of nuclear forces as both sides had achieved and 
were rapidly refining Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technology. However, President 
Kennedy’s previous statements declaring Cuba as a flashpoint for potential superpower conflict 
made it an ideal location for Khrushchev to provoke the United States into a crisis that the Soviet 
Politburo expected its rival would ultimately back down from.115 
In response to Khrushchev’s provocation, the Kennedy administration greatly escalated 
the crisis by deploying a naval blockade against Soviet transport carriers bound for Cuba. While 
not the most forceful military response available, the naval blockade was considered an 
appropriate escalatory response by the ExComm that would still give the Soviets the prerogative 
to back away from the brink of nuclear war.116 As previously noted, such a blockade in 
international waters was technically a valid casus belli for the Soviet Union to declare war on the 
United States under international law. However, the ExComm felt confident that the Soviet 
Union would not counter-escalate the conflict so rapidly and even hoped that such a blockade 
would bring a quick end to the crisis.117 As the alternative was nuclear war—an unacceptable 
scenario to both U.S. and Soviet leaders during this time period, the “quarantine” was quite 
evidently designed as a U.S. brinkmanship tactic.118 The demonstrated willingness of the U.S. 
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military establishment to take the crisis “to the brink” is further evidenced by the decision to 
change U.S. military readiness levels to DEFCON 2 over an open channel to ensure that the 
Soviets were aware of the increased threat status.119 
As a response, Khrushchev continued to escalate the crisis by ordering his transport 
carriers to continue toward the quarantine line in order to demonstrate that he was prepared to 
call the United States’ military bluff. Simultaneously, he ordered that the Cuban missile sites 
under construction continue and hasten their work and added to his demands for U.S. action.120 
This show of defiance led the United States to escalate the crisis one final time, wherein the 
Kennedy administration opted to formally ignore Khrushchev’s latest demands and openly began 
mobilizing military personnel and equipment around the country in a show of determination to 
invade the Caribbean island if a diplomatic solution was not reached.121 Having brought the 
crisis to the brink of actual military conflict, U.S. and Soviet leaders then engaged in a 
confrontational “stare-down” until finally Khrushchev “blinked” for lack of compelling 
remaining military options short of all-out nuclear war.122  
 
The Deterrence Model 
 
Using classical deterrence theory as our first alternative model, we find that it predicts 
that this period represents the beginning of a stable and non-confrontational dyadic relationship 
between the two superpowers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union had acquired a survivable second-strike nuclear capability. When two states both 
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maintain such capabilities, the system becomes known as mutually assured destruction, or MAD. 
Such capabilities are predicted to drastically reduce the incidence of conflict and prevent what 
crises do occur from escalating because of the overwhelming scale of devastation possible to 
both sides from a nuclear exchange. Put simply, there are no foreign policy objectives that 
warrant risk-taking if the potential costs, however remote, contain a nuclear strike.123 
In the Cuban case then, we should expect both the United States and the Soviet Union to 
avoid escalating crises to a degree where nuclear exchange could become a realistic possibility if 
MAD is the driving causal factor in the conflict. With both states in possession of nuclear 
weapons and maintaining survivable components of their nuclear arsenals in strategic air forces 
and submarines, mutual nuclear second-strike capability was nearly assured. As a consequence, 
neither state could reasonably expect to start and win a nuclear war with a nuclear first strike, as 
there was no guaranteed strategy to fully knock out the opposing side’s nuclear arsenal.124 
Because even just a few surviving nuclear missiles targeted on the right cities could produce 
unacceptable damage, neither side of the superpower rivalry ought to have been willing to “heat 
up” the Cold War to the level of nuclear confrontation. This mutual nuclear deterrence was then 
extended to most political and military interactions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, which in turn should have prevented both sides from seeking to escalate international 
disputes and crises for fear of provoking that same nuclear outcome. 
Under this perspective, we find that the principal actors in the Cuban Missile Crisis failed 
to act in accordance with the predications of rational deterrence. Although Cuba was seen as an 
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important foreign policy issue for both the United States and the Soviet Union, it was not a core 
national interest to either. As such, it is perplexing from a deterrence perspective why both 
superpowers would escalate the crisis to the brink of nuclear war. Faced with a rival with 
survivable nuclear capabilities, both sides should have opted out of further crisis escalation far 
earlier in the conflict.  
This prediction is particularly pertinent for the Soviet Union, as both the communists and 
the United States were aware that the strategic balance of nuclear forces still heavily favored the 
United States. Coupled with an awareness that the United States would still react strongly to a 
nuclear weapons presence so close to its borders even if Cuba was not a core national interest, 
the severe escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis by the Soviet Union makes little sense as a risk 
unless there was an additional causal factor at work bolstering confidence in the idea that nuclear 
weapons would not be used in such a crisis. As such, rational deterrence theory provides an 
inadequate explanatory framework for the brinkmanship behavior exhibited during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 
 
The Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
The nuclear stability-instability paradox takes the logic of MAD one step further than 
rational deterrence theory, positing that when states are confident in MAD’s capacity to prevent 
nuclear war they are much more likely to engage in lower-level conflict and foreign policy 
adventurism in rival states’ peripheral interests.125 Conflicts, however, should never escalate to a 
point where nuclear war becomes a possibility, as that would be a failure of the basic logic of 
deterrence that undergirds both models. 
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If it is the nuclear stability-instability paradox at work in our case, then we should expect 
to see the Soviet Union willing to interfere in the United States’ sphere of influence because elite 
decision-makers are confident in the stabilizing power of MAD. As confrontation arises, we 
should see an increase in low- and medium-level conflict; this phenomenon is again induced by 
the decision-maker confidence that the opposing side will be unwilling to escalate a conflict but 
so far in order to ensure that the dyad does not creep too close to the nuclear brink. If the conflict 
is not immediately resolved through a single round of force escalation, then we should ultimately 
see a cap on brinkmanship behavior and escalatory tactics well before approaching the nuclear 
threshold. 
Relative to the deterrence explanation then, the nuclear stability-instability paradox 
provides a much better explanation for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Spurred on by what he viewed 
as an unfair double standard as the United States placed operational Jupiter-class nuclear missiles 
in neighboring Turkey, Khrushchev sought to intervene in the United States’ own sphere of 
influence with a direct challenge not only to the policy of containment, but also to the Monroe 
Doctrine.126 Khrushchev writes in his memoirs: 
“When Dulles announced his policy of ‘rollback,’ that is, gradually tearing away 
one country after another from the socialist camp or countries that had friendly 
relations with us, his aim was to bring them under military influence. But since 
capitalist ideology is not especially attractive nowadays to most of the peoples of 
the world, Dulles was counting most of all on force…And I thought to myself: 
‘What if we were to come to an agreement with the government of Cuba and 
install [nuclear] missiles…so that it would be a secret from the United States?’ I 
came to the conclusion that if we did everything secretly and the Americans found 
out about it only after the missiles were in place and ready to be launched, they 
would have to stop and think before making the risky decision to wipe out our 
missiles by military force.”127 
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Khrushchev continues later in his memoirs, citing that “[the United States] has surrounded [the 
Soviet Union] with military bases and kept our country under the constant threat of nuclear 
attack. But now the Americans themselves would experience what such a situation feels like.”128 
It was well-known internationally, including amongst the Soviets, that the United States viewed 
Latin America and the Caribbean as an integral component of its foreign policy.129 Clearly then, 
Khrushchev sought to ensure the success of the Cuban revolution in the United States’ sphere of 
influence and reverse the growing political trend of U.S. dominance in international affairs with 
the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, which he viewed as a deterrent to military invasion. 
Meanwhile, the United States spent much of the summer prior to the Crisis warning both 
Castro and the Soviets against an offensive arms build-up so close to American soil.130 As the 
crisis began to boil over in October 1962, both sides engaged in several succeeding rounds of 
escalation just as anticipated by the nuclear stability-instability paradox. Khrushchev began the 
brinkmanship spiral by first ordering the arms build-up and nuclear missile deployment to Cuba. 
This was then followed by the naval blockade ordered by President Kennedy, in what was to 
most observers a technical breach of international law. Khrushchev took the crisis even further to 
the brink of nuclear war by ordering his ships to continue toward the quarantine line and adding 
to his original demands for peaceful settlement. Kennedy then exhibited brinkmanship behavior 
a final time by ordering the American military on alert and directly threatening Khrushchev and 
Castro with an invasion of the island—a threat that carried with it the implication of nuclear 
war.131 In each of these instances, both leaders left the opposing side ample time to back away 
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from the heightened threat before it was to be implemented. This is a definitive feature of 
brinkmanship behavior, confirming our hypothesis’ predictions for the case. 
However, the spiral of brinkmanship tactics and escalation that occurred in the second 
week of the crisis significantly exceeds the scope of conflict generally predicted by the nuclear 
stability-instability paradox. As I have previously noted, the destabilizing element of the nuclear 
stability-instability paradox stems from the confidence that decision-makers in both states have 
in the power of MAD to prevent major war from breaking out. As a consequence, at some point 
we should have seen a limit on the escalatory tactics and brinkmanship used in the conflict. This 
is not what happened in our case however—it took the threat of nuclear escalation by President 
Kennedy to ultimately convince Khrushchev to back away from the brink.132 As such, we must 
conclude that the nuclear stability-instability paradox provides an incomplete explanation for the 
brinkmanship behavior observed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo: The Traditional Logic 
 
 The traditional nuclear taboo tells us that states refrain from using nuclear weapons 
because elite decision-makers feel that they are immoral or inhumane.133 In a world with a 
moderately robust nuclear taboo, we should expect to see leaders increasingly reticent to employ 
nuclear weapons or even discuss employing them as a viable tactical or strategic option. In an 
ideal case world, we would expect to see such decision-makers commenting on the immorality of 
nuclear weapons, the public’s distaste for them, and the reputation costs inherent to violating 
such an international norm. Since the nuclear taboo is only moderately robust, however, we 
should still see some leaders advocating their use in combat and in brinkmanship scenarios. 
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 For the Cuban Missile Crisis, we should then expect the nuclear taboo to moderately 
impact the decision-making of both the Americans and the Soviets. If the traditional nuclear 
taboo correctly explains the outcome of this case, U.S. and Soviet decision-makers ought to 
initially consider the use of nuclear weapons and then ultimately dispense with the idea for the 
reasons listed above. However, we would expect some elements of the decision-making 
leadership—most particularly from within the military establishment—to still advocate the use 
of nuclear weapons in the conflict despite the nuclear taboo. This would be especially true on the 
U.S. side of the conflict, as there was a significant component of the U.S. military establishment 
at the time that held the opinion that a nuclear war was still winnable. Furthermore, we should 
see elite decision-makers shying away from the outbreak of major war—which might involve the 
deployment of nuclear weapons—for fear of the same reputational and moral costs outlined 
earlier. 
 Before we can examine our predictions, we must first establish that the nuclear taboo was 
in fact moderately robust during the time period. During the 1950s, the antinuclear movement 
both in the United States and abroad had grown large enough to achieve political relevance. 
Internationally, antinuclear movements spread across Europe, the non-aligned states, and even 
within the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev permitted American ‘San Francisco to Moscow’ 
anti-nuclear protesters to march unimpeded across more than 600 miles of Soviet territory in 
1961.134 A November 1959 Gallup poll also found that 77 percent of Americans supported 
extending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear testing moratorium.135 The taboo infiltrated the discourse of 
the 1960 presidential race as well, with Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, 
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and even the Republican candidate Richard Nixon pledging their support for a nuclear test ban. 
Kennedy additionally promised that the United States would not be the first state to resume 
atmospheric testing and that he would “earnestly seek an overall disarmament agreement.”136 
Robert McNamara reports that as early as the late 1950s he urged both Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson to never initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and that both of them agreed with this 
precept.137 It is clear then that the nuclear taboo was slowly becoming internalized within the 
U.S. and global political consciousness by the beginning of the 1960s. 
 With the relative strength of the taboo established, we can now continue on to see that the 
Cuban Missile Crisis largely fulfills our predictions outlined above. Khrushchev originally had 
Soviet nuclear missiles transported to Cuba in order to rectify what he saw as a political 
imbalance more so than a strategic one—while adding the missiles to Cuba would not much 
change the strategic balance of nuclear forces, it was a strong counter-action to the U.S. 
deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey earlier that year. Certainly Khrushchev had no original 
intent to instigate a nuclear confrontation with the United States.138 As the conflict developed, 
both sides deliberately sought to contain the crisis short of all-out war while still seeking to turn 
the situation into a political win. This is especially critical for the United States, which at the 
time had a substantially larger nuclear arsenal than the Soviet Union. This led some U.S. military 
officials to the conclusion that the United States could launch a nuclear first-strike that would 
have knocked out most missile sites capable of striking the U.S. homeland.139 However, the 
ExComm demonstrated significant interest in preventing even limited nuclear attacks on the 
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United States and more extensive ones of U.S. allies in Europe, even though such a first-strike 
would have dealt significantly more damage to the Soviet Union. 
 There is further evidence that the U.S. leadership was very concerned not only about the 
material costs of escalation, but also the country’s moral standing in the world. During one 
meeting of the ExComm, Under-Secretary of State George Ball summed up the committee’s 
thinking on a pre-emptive nuclear airstrike on the Cuban launch sites:  
“[W]e cannot launch a surprise attack against Cuba without destroying our moral 
position and alienating our friends and allies. If we were to do so we would wake 
up the following morning to find that we had brought down in ruins the structure 
of alliances and arrangements and that our whole post-war effort of trying to 
organize the combined strength of the Free World was in shards and tatters.”140 
 
Other members of the ExComm also made comments indicative of the nuclear taboo in the 
months leading up to the crisis. McNamara wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as early as February 
1961 that the first operating assumption regarding U.S. nuclear weapons was that “we will not 
strike first with such weapons.”141 Dean Rusk later recalled that during one of the ExComm 
meetings he argued that a nuclear attack was unfeasible because “world opinion would turn 
against [the United States] because we didn’t first try diplomatic avenues” and that Kennedy 
himself was worried about “an adverse public reaction” to a nuclear strike.142 Here it is clear that 
the nuclear taboo was at work within the ExComm, as decision-makers grappled with notions of 
morality and international reputation in addition to basic rationalist material considerations. In 
particular, these quotations make it evident that elite U.S. decision-makers were cognizant of an 
international normative prohibition on nuclear weapons, one which they must consider even if 
they did not completely subscribe to it themselves.  
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The Nuclear Taboo Paradox 
 
 Lastly, we turn to the question of whether the nuclear taboo paradox best explains the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. In a system where the nuclear taboo is moderately robust, we should 
expect to observe elite decision-makers in nuclear states feel normative or moral restraints from 
using nuclear weapons. Because the taboo is an international norm, rival states should also be 
cognizant of the taboo. If both states are nuclear, the awareness of nuclear taboo should 
encourage the use of brinkmanship tactics. But because the nuclear taboo is not fully inculcated 
into all states, leaders should still take material considerations into account and even suggest and 
plan for nuclear strikes. Specifically, we would predict extensive elite-level discussions about the 
material accounting of a potential nuclear exchange intermixed with taboo and normative-moral 
language. Indeed, in a period where neither the nuclear taboo nor classical deterrence fully 
dominate, we would expect to see brinkmanship behavior and escalatory tactics spiral much 
further toward major war than we would expect under a more robust nuclear taboo. These 
anticipated outcomes differ from our predictions for the traditional nuclear taboo in that they 
specifically expect more severe conflict and increased frequency in the use of brinkmanship as a 
result of the nuclear taboo; traditional taboo theory only predicts that the taboo will influence 
elites to not use nuclear weapons in conflict or escalate conflict to major war. 
In the Cuban Missile Crisis, we should expect to see the nuclear taboo paradox impact the 
decision-making of American and Soviet military and political elites. Some discussion of the 
material capabilities of nuclear weapons would likely be evident, but this discussion would 
eventually be overridden by moral and normative considerations related to the nuclear taboo. 
During the decision-making process, however, we should expect to see significant brinkmanship 
behavior on both sides of the conflict as a result of the mutual recognition of the nuclear taboo’s 
Andrew Bessler 
 
74 
 
constraining effect on the use of nuclear weapons. Because the nuclear taboo was not fully 
integrated into the international system, we should also expect to see much more severe 
brinkmanship behavior than we would otherwise as normative forces clash with materialist 
concerns; this would be especially true for the United States during this period, which possessed 
what was believed to be a superior nuclear posture perhaps capable of a successful nuclear first-
strike. 
 The empirics of this case match these predictions. As we have previously discussed, 
Khrushchev did not seek major war when he originally devised the Soviet plan to install nuclear 
weapons in Cuba. Likewise, both sides went to great lengths to prevent the outbreak of actual 
major war. This comes in spite of evidence that suggests that this would have been an ideal 
period for the United States to initiate a nuclear first-strike on the Soviet Union if decision-
makers were convinced that nuclear confrontation was inevitable due to the relative balance of 
nuclear forces.143 We have also already established that this restraint was in large part due to the 
moral force of the nuclear taboo. What the traditional nuclear taboo does not explain, however, is 
the extreme level of brinkmanship behavior exhibited during the Crisis—this is the defining 
question we seek to answer with the nuclear taboo paradox. 
In accordance with the predictions of nuclear taboo paradox, we do in fact see a severe 
spiral of brinkmanship behavior in the Cuban case. Throughout the conflict, both the Soviets and 
the Americans made it clear that they were deliberately leaving room for the other side to back 
down short of nuclear war. Consequently, the ExComm opted to respond to the initial Soviet 
shipment of nuclear weapons to Cuba with a naval “quarantine” on the island, a move that 
escalated the dispute but also allowed the Soviet Union to reverse its course of action without 
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major violence.144 The Soviet Union responded by altering its original demands to include the 
removal of the Jupiter-class missiles from Turkey and to order the work on the Cuba missile sites 
to continue as the nuclear transport ships continued toward the blockade—again an escalatory 
behavior intended to bring the conflict to yet another military “brink” while still leaving the 
United States with breathing space to defuse the conflict short of major war. Finally, President 
Kennedy opted to bring the conflict to the furthest “brink” possible short of all-out war by 
ensuring the U.S. military preparations for a nuclear conflict were patently clear to Soviet 
intelligence.145 While this brinkmanship spiral came far closer to major war than nuclear taboo 
paradox would ordinarily predict, the taboo’s moderate strength in the international system 
meant that traditional deterrence logic calculations also weighed heavily on the minds of 
policymakers during the crisis, further destabilizing the dispute. In accordance with our 
predictions for this case, more significant brinkmanship behavior came from the United States, 
which held superiority in material nuclear capabilities during the period and felt this diametric 
tension.  
 
Examining the Evidence: Conflict Severity Between the Cases 
I will now turn to examine the second hypothesis concerning conflict severity. This 
hypothesis analyzes the outcomes of the nuclear taboo paradox across cases, rather than the 
processes within each case. Specifically, if the nuclear taboo paradox is at work, we should 
expect to see evidence of increasingly severe low- and mid-level conflict as the strength of the 
nuclear taboo increases. To test Hypothesis 2, I will compare the severity of the first two cases 
based on the qualitative research design outlined in Chapter Two.  
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Comparing Conflict Severity: Korea and Cuba 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Korean War was the first instance in which the 
Cold War became “hot” with proxy warfare. In terms of military losses, the conflict was one of 
the more deadly ones of the second half of the twentieth century. While definitive numbers are 
impossible to tally due to poor record sourcing, most military scholars place the death toll for the 
conflict around two million military personnel.146 However, as discussed in Chapter 3, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union deliberately and actively sought to keep the conflict 
contained to the Korean peninsula so as to avoid an escalation toward global war.147 Indeed, 
while the Soviet-allied Chinese ultimately intervened in the conflict, the Soviet Union itself 
refused to intervene apart from providing North Korean forces with military equipment and 
funding.148 To reconcile these two seemingly competing descriptions of the conflict, we need to 
look not directly at the conflict itself, but rather at what might have resulted had the nuclear 
taboo not been at play—then we can appropriately place the historical outcome on a relative 
scale of potential outcomes rank-ordered by increasing severity. 
When examining the Korean War in this light, we find that the actual historical outcome 
was only one of many divergent potential outcomes that could have resulted in both greatly 
increased and decreased severity. For example, on one extreme the United States could have 
chosen not to intervene or to follow the Soviet Union’s lead and only provide indirect military 
aid and financing to the South Korean forces. Prior to the invasion, in fact, the United States held 
no official foreign policy position on the peninsula apart from a desire for reintegration. 
Likewise, the Korean Peninsula was not regarded as a vital component of the newly-minted 
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containment effort even within the Pacific theater, where the continued security of occupied 
Japan reigned supreme.149 Had key early decisions been made differently, escalation of the 
conflict beyond a superpower-financed civil war might have been relatively insignificant. On the 
other extreme, however, was the possibility of escalation to full-scale global war, which very 
likely would have gone nuclear. This also was a very real possibility, particularly following the 
Chinese intervention and later with the beginning of the Eisenhower administration in a bid to 
end the war.150 Between these two extremes come a number of alternative outcomes, including 
an early halt to hostilities at a number of points earlier in the war and immediate U.S. support of 
the South Koreans following the initial invasion.151 
Framed in this context, we must conclude that the actual historical outcome of the Korean 
War is situated very nearly in the middle of these possibilities. There were certainly a number of 
opportunities for both sides to limit or end the hostilities that were not taken, but there were 
certainly just as many opportunities to expand the conflict that were avoided in a deliberate effort 
to keep the war contained to the peninsula. It is this active and deliberate reticence to escalate the 
conflict, particularly on the U.S. side with its de facto nuclear monopoly, combined with the 
context of the prevailing tactical military doctrine, which must lead us to the conclusion that in 
spite of the high casualties the Korean War was a relatively limited conflict. 
Turning to the Cuban Missile crisis, we find that, in terms of casualties, the conflict was 
extremely limited, with only one recorded death.152 This statistic is misleading, however. While 
the Korean War was typified by restraint and a reluctance to escalate, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
was characterized by both sides seeking to escalate and bluff their rival into backing away from 
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the brink of global nuclear war. Indeed, most Cold War scholars regard the Cuban Missile Crisis 
as the closest the world has ever come to nuclear warfare.153 
There were a number of critical decision points during the crisis that would have had 
significant ramifications for the overall resolution of the conflict has they been made differently. 
Of particular note is President Kennedy and the ExComm’s initial response. Recall that the 
ExComm discussed a number of responses ranging from doing nothing to the invasion of 
Cuba.154 A change in this critical first response would have significantly affected the outcome of 
the crisis. No response would have brought a quick end to the conflict but heightened 
superpower tensions and a full-out invasion likely would have triggered nuclear war. Later in the 
conflict, however, elite decision-makers exhibited a willingness to risk severe conflict, such as 
when Khrushchev ordered the nuclear transport ships past the quarantine line and when President 
Kennedy threatened invasion of the island.155 It should be noted, however, that throughout the 
conflict both sides gave the adversary ample time to back down in a bid to avoid full-on major 
war. In a counterfactual world where outcomes were more severe than the actual historical 
outcome, elite decision-makers would have allowed the opposing side less time to capitulate and 
would have escalated the conflict even further. Contrariwise, in a counterfactual world where 
outcomes were less severe than the actual history, we would have seen much more gradual 
escalation and an elite tendency to back away from the brink earlier in the confrontation. 
As can be seen from these counterfactuals, the tack taken by U.S. and Soviet leaders 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis was neither the most nor the least severe of all possible 
outcomes—the crisis could have just as easily been defused in its earliest stages as it could have 
ended in global nuclear war. Indeed, there were many more opportunities to de-escalate the 
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conflict that were foregone than there were to intensify it. Perhaps more important than these 
counterfactuals is the actual context of the conflict, wherein the dispute itself revolved around 
the presence of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis hinged almost completely on an 
either-or question of peaceful defusing hostilities or nuclear warfare—had direct military action 
been undertaken by either side, the result almost certainly would have been nuclear war, rather 
than a less severe form of conventional conflict. In this regard, we can conclude that the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was a severe crisis in spite of a lack of combat deaths or direct military 
confrontation because of the high potentiality for such an extreme form of conflict. 
From a comparative perspective then, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a significantly more 
severe conflict that the Korean War. This is in line with the predictions of the nuclear taboo 
paradox as outlined in Hypothesis 2. Where elites during the Korean War deliberately sought to 
contain the conflict and prevent escalation, elites during the Cuban Missile were much more 
willing to engage in brinkmanship and escalatory behavior, bringing the world far closer to the 
edge of nuclear war than it had ever been before or has since.  
Indeed, one might argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis violates the major war caveat of 
the nuclear taboo paradox by approaching nuclear war so closely. However, as previously noted, 
this phenomenon is best explained by the unique crossroads in nuclear thinking that was 
occurring on both sides of the Cold War during the early 1960s. With neither deterrence nor the 
nuclear taboo predominating, the world of the Cuban Missile Crisis was particularly unstable and 
prone to conflict escalation. This explanation is further evidenced not only from the mix of 
rationalist and normative-moral discourse in elite-level discussion during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, but also from the proliferation of significant superpower disputes during this period.156 
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Consequently, such extreme brinkmanship behavior does not on its own undermine the logic of 
the nuclear taboo paradox.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that the nuclear taboo paradox provides the best explanation for 
the behavior of leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As the nuclear taboo increased in 
strength throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, elites increasingly factored it into their 
strategic decision-making, even if they themselves personally did not yet completely subscribe to 
the norm. Consequently, we see increased brinkmanship behavior that is both iterated and more 
severe than in the Korean case. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis pushed the superpowers to the 
very brink of nuclear war. This outcome can be attributed to the unique period in which it took 
place as the dominant mode of elite thinking was in the process of shifting from traditional 
balance-of-forces toward the taboo. 
The examination of the crisis through the four theoretical lenses yielded the best results 
for the nuclear taboo and the nuclear taboo paradox. Of these two, the nuclear taboo paradox 
provided additional explanatory value to the case that traditional taboo theory was unable to 
supply. I also tested my theory on Hypothesis 2, finding that the Cuban Missile Crisis was in fact 
a more severe conflict than the Korean War by any reasonable measure. This was in accordance 
with our original predictions as well. In the following chapter, I will examine a final case with a 
strongly robust taboo, expecting to find even more instances of brinkmanship behavior and 
severe low- to mid-level conflict. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989 
 In the last decades of the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet relations began to deteriorate after a 
brief period of détente. Where the late 1960s and most of the 1970s were typified by arms and 
trade agreements and indirect competition in the developing world, the late 1970s and 1980s 
marked a resurgence in ideological and proxy military conflict between the two superpowers.  
However, as the Cold War heated up, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons also 
grew stronger. The anti-nuclear movement was in the midst of a resurgence following renewed 
efforts by the U.S. military establishment to develop tactical, high radiation, and neutron-yield 
nuclear weapons. Further, several nuclear disarmament and arms limitations treaties were signed 
by the superpowers during this period.157   
This stage of the Cold war serves as the ideal opportunity to the implications of the 
nuclear taboo paradox for periods in which the norm against the use of nuclear weapons is 
strong. Specifically, this chapter will analyze the brinkmanship and conflict behavior exhibited 
by Moscow and Washington during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. 
 The literature on the traditional nuclear taboo claims that by this point in the Cold War 
the taboo was firmly entrenched in international organizations and elite strategic thinking. Thus, 
it would predict that nuclear states would be less willing to become involved in conflict due to 
concerns about escalation that might lead to a violation of the taboo. The nuclear taboo paradox, 
however, predicts that, because the taboo is strong, we should see a greater frequency and 
severity of brinkmanship tactics and escalatory behavior than in earlier periods of the Cold War, 
such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This outcome is expected because the stronger the 
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nuclear taboo becomes, the more confident leaders will be that no state will use nuclear weapons. 
When nuclear war is highly improbable, leaders worry less that lower level conflicts will escalate 
to the point of a nuclear exchange, freeing them to take advantage of opportunities for foreign 
policy adventurism. 
 In this chapter, I argue that elite decision-making during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan can be explained by the nuclear taboo paradox, but that unique factors of the case 
attenuate some of the paradox’s effect, particularly on the United States. The empirical evidence 
specifically suggests that the strength of the nuclear taboo was not universal—namely it was less 
influential in the Soviet Union than in the Western bloc—and that the United States was 
constrained from escalating the conflict by a number of domestic variables. 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide a brief account of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the next section, I examine each identified instance of 
brinkmanship behavior through the theoretical lens of my theory, the nuclear taboo, and two 
alternative realist theories.  I then focus on my second hypothesis by comparing the severity of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally, I 
end the chapter with some concluding remarks on some of the unique factors involved in this 
case and set us up for my concluding analysis in Chapter Six. 
 
Historical Overview 
 
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is rooted in one of many developing world political 
upheavals that were characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. King Mohammed Zahir Shah ruled 
Afghanistan from 1933 until the early 1970s. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Marxist People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) began to gain political power under the leadership of 
Zahir’s cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, who served as the state’s prime minister from 1954 to 
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1963.158 On July 17, 1973, Daoud Khan seized power from King Zahir Shah in a military coup, 
accusing the king’s administration of corruption and mismanagement of the economy. Daoud 
Khan’s rule was short-lived, however, due to factionalism within the PDPA; while popular with 
the general population of Afghanistan, his repression of political activities spurred a portion of 
the party to splinter and join forces with the Afghan Army.159 On April 27, 1978, Daoud Khan 
was captured and executed, while Nur Muhammad Taraki, then secretary-general of the PDPA, 
installed himself as both the president and prime minister of the newly reorganized Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan.160 Almost immediately, Taraki began implementing Soviet-style 
reforms on issues ranging from land ownership and industrialization to marriage customs and 
private debts.161 
 Many of the reforms implemented under Taraki were not well-received by many 
conservatives in rural areas, particularly religious leaders and land owners.162 By the summer of 
1978, pockets of revolt had sprung up in Nuristan and Badakhstan. The revolt against the 
communist government cut across class and ethnic lines, in some cases uniting tribes that had 
fought one another for centuries.163 Religious leaders declared a jihad, and soon the area of the 
state under the Taraki regime’s control began to shrink as mujaheddin—holy warriors—
dominated the countryside.164  
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Concerned about the rising tide of revolts and the perceived possibility for an 
intervention by Iran, Pakistan, or agents of the United States or China, the Afghan government 
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation on December 5, 1978 with 
the Soviet Union. Although the treaty contained few specifics, Article 4 included an implicit 
security commitment from the Soviets.165 Almost immediately, the Afghan government 
requested Soviet assistance in combating the rebels.  Indeed, the government made 21 requests 
for aid in 1979 alone.166 Although initially reticent to provide military support, the Soviet 
Politburo determined that the deteriorating situation in Kabul had become so severe by late 1979 
that it warranted intervention. Unbeknownst to Taraki, however, was that Soviet officials 
concluded that any intervention required a full takeover of the government and forced regime 
change in order to stabilize the state.167 
 On December 25, 1979, Soviet mechanized forces crossed the Soviet-Afghan border near 
Herat. Two days later, Soviet airborne and special forces captured critical points in Kabul and 
killed most of the major government officials, including Taraki and Prime Minister Hafizullah 
Amin.168 Babrak Karmal, a political leader considered more cooperative by the Soviet 
leadership, was installed as the new president of Afghanistan on December 28.  
The international response to the Soviet invasion was decidedly negative, with the United 
States introducing a General Assembly resolution condemning the intervention. The resolution, 
along with a number of political and diplomatic sanctions, passed with a vote of 104-18.169 In 
Afghanistan, the invasion and the installation of Karmal was seen as further evidence of a 
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communist desire to meddle in Afghan affairs. This is turn led to mass defections from the army 
and a corresponding increase in the strength of the mujaheddin.170 Sensing an opportunity to 
damage the Soviet Union politically, the United States began covertly shipping small arms and 
anti-aircraft missiles to elements of the mujaheddin as part of Operation Cyclone.171 
 After several months of combat operations within Afghanistan, it became increasingly 
clear to Soviet military planners that a limited intervention would be insufficient to prop up the 
Karmal regime. The Afghan Army, which the Soviets had hoped could shoulder the brunt of 
actual combat operations, proved ineffective due to low morale and widespread desertions.172 
Meanwhile, Soviet troops found themselves beset by a tactical doctrine ill-suited to Afghan 
terrain and fraternization of Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz Soviet military elements with their 
Afghan counterparts.173 Believing that the United States would not become more involved in the 
conflict, the Soviets opted to launch a full-scale counterinsurgency occupation. For the first 
several years of the conflict, they conducted sweep-and-destroy missions and indiscriminate 
aerial assaults on towns and villages.174 
Beginning in 1986, Soviet leaders began to fear that a true victory, wherein the 
mujaheddin were pacified and a Soviet-friendly government was able to exercise influence 
outside of the capital, was impossible to achieve. After six years of continuous combat 
operations, the Afghan government controlled only Kabul and a few other major city centers, 
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while Soviet casualties were on the rise due to increased mujaheddin combat capabilities 
resulting from significant U.S., Chinese, and Saudi foreign aid.175  
Seeking favorable political circumstances under which they could withdraw, the Soviets 
slowly eased Karmal out of power and replaced him with General Mohammed Najibullah. 
Najibullah sought to appease the mujaheddin insurgents with reconciliation efforts and new 
Soviet-designed policies—to little effect.176 In 1987, a limited cease-fire was declared, while in 
Geneva multilateral talks were held on the subject of Soviet withdrawal. A peace accord was 
finally signed between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union on April 
14, 1988, after which most combat operations ceased.177 However, limited fighting took place as 
elements of the mujaheddin harassed withdrawing Soviet forces and jockeyed for post-
occupation political position. On February 15, 1989 the final Soviet column departed 
Afghanistan.178  
 
Examining the Evidence: Escalation During the Soviet Invasion 
 When compared to both of our previous cases, it is apparent that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan is more similar to the Korean War than the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet 
invasion was a sustained combat situation, rather than an escalatory dispute as in Cuba. As with 
the Korean War, there were discrete instances of brinkmanship tactics and escalatory tactics used 
during the dispute. I examine these incidents to determine whether they are consistent with the 
predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox or our three alternative theories.  
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 During the period in which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place, proponents of 
the nuclear taboo generally agree that the norm against the use of nuclear weapons had become 
quite strong. While the taboo was perhaps not as strong as it is in the post-Cold War 
environment, it had the greatest influence over Cold War international politics during the 
1980s.179 In accordance with the nuclear taboo paradox, we should then expect to see a 
significant amount of brinkmanship and escalatory behavior among the nuclear dyads.  
 Interestingly, there is only one case of escalatory behavior during the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan. Following the first year of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, 
the Soviet Politburo faced a dilemma. Contrary to initial Soviet expectations, it had failed to 
subdue revolt in Afghanistan, despite its superior capabilities. In fact, anti-interventionist and 
anti-Communist sentiment in Afghanistan united diverse ethnic, ideological, and socioeconomic 
factions in armed opposition to the Soviets and the leftist puppet regime in Kabul.180 Rather than 
a limited intervention in which the Afghan Army conducted the preponderance of the military 
operations, Soviet military planners soon found their own troops had to carry much of the 
combat burden. At this point that the Soviets were faced with a choice: return home in defeat or 
greatly expand the conflict by conducting a full-scale and long-term counterinsurgency 
occupation of Afghanistan.181 The Soviets ultimately chose to escalate the conflict, electing to 
follow a path that would leave them mired in Afghanistan for the next eight years.  
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A number of factors contributed to Soviet decision-making. Moscow perceived a radical 
Islamic Afghanistan as a threat to the stability of the southern Soviet-bloc states that contained 
some 30 million Muslims.182 Access to resources, and particularly a desire to put the Soviet 
Union 200 miles closer to the Straits of Hormuz and a warm water port, also played a role.183 
Most important, perhaps, was the notion that a state that had “successfully” made the transition 
to communism should not be permitted to backslide or become vulnerable to the West.184 
However, the necessary condition for Soviet military intervention was opportunity. The Soviets 
observed a growing U.S. reticence to become directly involved in third world affairs and took 
advantage of this new reluctance to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.185  
 
The Deterrence Model 
 
 Deterrence theory predicts a stable relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the late Cold War period. By the end of the 1970s, both superpowers had had a 
reliable second-strike capability for over a decade.186 In particular, the Soviet Union had closed 
the qualitative and quantitative gaps in its nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the United States. Because 
neither state had the possibility of winning a nuclear confrontation without sustaining massive 
retaliatory damage from the other in the process, both the Soviet Union and the United States 
ought to have avoided foreign policy confrontations. This would have been disrupted by the 
Reagan administration’s drive to reignite the arms race and the controversial move toward 
                                               
182 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 157. 
183 Ibid., 159. 
184 Galeotti, Last War, 12. 
185 Elie Krakowski, “Afghanistan: The Geopolitical Implications of Soviet Control,” in Afghanistan: The Great 
Game Revisited, ed. Rosanne Klass, [New York: Freedom House, 1987], 167. 
186 Robert J. Art, “The United States: Nuclear Decision-Making, 1939-1989, in Security with Nuclear Weapons? 
Different Perspectives on National Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 87. 
Andrew Bessler 
 
89 
 
developing a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, but as these efforts did not result in 
tangible changes to the U.S. defense posture, the long-run effect ought to have been negligible.187 
 Thus, the deterrence model leads us to expect that both superpowers would avoid any 
conflict or dispute escalation that had even the remote possibility of spiraling into a nuclear war. 
In the case of Afghanistan, if the United States believed that this country was vital to its 
containment strategy, then deterrent threats should have been issued prior to the Soviet invasion 
and Moscow should have abided by such threats. However, if the United States did not see much 
initial value in Afghanistan, then we ought to see the Soviet Union free to intervene in the state’s 
internal affairs and the United States reluctant to respond militarily. In other words, under a fully 
robust system of MAD deterrent threats should be issued from the state which holds the foreign 
policy region in highest value and the opposing state should abide by such threats by refraining 
from action. 
 I find that the Afghanistan case fulfills the predictions of this second scenario reasonably 
well, although there is no evidence of a direct deterrent threat made by either superpower at any 
time during the decade-long conflict. Prior to the invasion in 1979, the United States did not 
perceive Afghanistan as a critical foreign policy interest. At this time, Washington sent 
substantial aid to neighboring Pakistan, which was viewed by most U.S. elites as the far more 
strategically important state in the region. As Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert G. Neumann 
put it: “the Soviet Union had a legitimate interest in stability along its southern border, while the 
U.S. interest was of a lesser degree, that is, to help Afghans protect their independence.”188 
Ambassador Neumann later wrote in 1971 in a State Department policy review that: 
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“For the United States, Afghanistan has at the present limited direct interest; it is 
not an important trading partner; it is not an access route for U.S. trade with 
others; it is not presently…a source of oil or scarce strategic metals;…there are no 
treaty ties or defense commitments; and Afghanistan does not provide us with 
significant defense, intelligence, or scientific facilities…”189 
 
As a consequence of this position, the United States did little to deter the Soviet Union prior to 
the invasion. President Jimmy Carter made no public statements on the subject until after the 
initial invasion, despite possessing intelligence pointing to an imminent Soviet attack on 
Afghanistan as early as April 1979.190 Indeed, only a private warning was issued to the Soviets 
on August 5, 1979 stating that “outside interference [in Afghanistan]…would be regarded very 
seriously.”191 With no existing deterrent, the Soviets then felt free to invade to the south. 
 In accordance with the expectations of deterrence theory, once the Soviet Union 
mobilized, the range of possible actions available to U.S. policymakers was immediately 
constrained. While President Carter did impose a number of economic and diplomatic sanctions 
on the Soviet Union in response to the invasion, no direct military action was taken.192 A number 
of U.S. elites are recorded as stating that they did not wish to directly intervene militarily in the 
Afghanistan conflict because of serious concerns of provoking the Soviet Union to escalate the 
conflict. President Carter indicated that during a National Security Council meeting, the majority 
of his advisors concluded that “[d]irect military action on our part was not advisable.”193 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance echoed this notion in a private letter to Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, warning that a direct military confrontation would create “a high risk that each 
[superpower] might miscalculate the actions of the other” and that “it was vital that both [the 
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Soviet Union and the United States] give sober consideration to the implications of the current 
situation for each side’s interest in the maintenance of world peace.”194 As a result, the United 
States opted only to provide financing and materiel to the mujaheddin. 
 The most substantial problem for deterrence theory in this case is that there is no record 
of any attempt by the Soviet Union to deter a potential U.S. military intervention. Rather, the 
potential for escalation if the United States intervened appears to have been implicitly accepted 
by U.S. decision-makers. While this does not undermine the ability of deterrence theory to 
explain this case, since MAD had existed between the two superpowers for over a decade at this 
point, it does make the case less robust. Additionally, while deterrence theory explains initial 
Soviet behavior and the subsequent lack of U.S. military intervention, it cannot fully account for 
why the Soviets chose to escalate the Afghanistan conflict in 1980. 
 
The Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
 The nuclear stability-instability paradox suggests that, because of MAD, nuclear states 
are confident that foreign policy adventurism against another state in areas of peripheral strategic 
interest will not be met with escalated nuclear retaliation. Therefore, they are free to provoke 
crises and engage in low-level uses of force as the conventional balance-of-forces suits them.  
 In the Afghanistan case, the nuclear stability-instability paradox predicts that Soviet 
decision-makers initially should have opted to intervene if it was in the country’s national 
interest, particularly in a target with no nuclear “umbrella.” Should the United States have found 
the dispute to have been of sufficient strategic interest, it would also predict that Washington 
would have been willing to intervene militarily. In other words, Soviet and American leaders 
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ought to have been confident that the logic of MAD would have prevented either country from 
escalating the conflict into a nuclear confrontation. 
In this case the nuclear stability-instability paradox is less consistent with the empirical 
findings than basic deterrence theory. Soviet behavior in 1979 is consistent with the predictions 
outlined above. But the United States failed to intervene in the conflict after the Soviets initially 
invaded—even though the invasion challenged its policy of containment. 
Although the Carter administration did not regard Afghanistan as particularly important 
prior to the Soviet invasion, its view changed dramatically in December 1979. Preoccupied with 
the hostage crisis in Iran and attempting to solidify an alliance with Pakistan, President Carter 
and other U.S. elites began to view the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan axis as an “arc of crisis” 
which, if overtaken by Soviet control or influence, would greatly threaten major U.S. strategic 
interests in the Persian Gulf.195 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized the 
conflict as “not a local, but a strategic challenge,” and President Carter himself declared in his 
1980 State of the Union address that “[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States…[and] will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”196 Therefore, 
U.S. policymakers saw Afghanistan as strategically important after the Soviet invasion, if not 
before.  
Even so, the Carter administration limited itself to economic and diplomatic sanctions. 
This outcome is contrary to the nuclear stability-instability paradox, which predicts that the 
knowledge that the Soviet Union would not escalate the conflict to the point of nuclear war 
should have encouraged the United States to intervene with direct military force. As such, we 
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must conclude that the nuclear stability-instability paradox does not explain the Afghanistan 
case.  
 
The Nuclear Taboo  
 
 The logic of the nuclear taboo predicts that states will refrain from using nuclear weapons 
because of a powerful prohibitive norm in the international community against their use. In a 
system with a robust nuclear taboo, we would expect to see leaders reluctant to even discuss the 
use of nuclear weapons in combat, opting instead to use conventional military force even where 
it might be less effective tactically than employing nuclear weapons. When commenting on 
nuclear weapons, both publically and privately, leaders should use moral or normative rhetoric, 
categorizing the atom bomb as a “weapon of mass destruction,” “inhumane,” “non-
discriminatory,” and “unethical.” Over time, the taboo should be increasingly internalized by 
both leaders and institutions on the national and international levels.197 
 During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it then follows that we should see low levels 
of conflict, if we see any at all. States will seek to avoid severe conflict that might make the use 
of nuclear weapons more likely, which elites and publics alike view as abhorrent. We should also 
expect to see elites rarely discuss the nuclear option, as it should be generally accepted by most, 
if not all, policymakers that such weapons may only be used as a deterrent. If nuclear weapons 
are brought up for consideration, we should see the notion quickly dismissed for normative-
moral reasons. 
The Afghanistan case is generally consistent with the nuclear taboo. Once the conflict 
was initiated by the Soviet Union, the United States opted not to intervene directly with military 
force so as not to escalate the dispute. While President Carter remarked in his memoirs that his 
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National Security Council briefly discussed the possible use of nuclear weapons if the Soviets 
continued their advance toward the Indian Ocean, there is no evidence that the use of nuclear 
weapons was considered in response to the invasion of Afghanistan.198 While the logic of 
deterrence can explain why the Carter and Reagan administrations chose not to use nuclear 
weapons in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, it is also possible that the strong taboo was a 
factor as well.  
The U.S. and global antinuclear movements revived significantly in the early 1980s, with 
the Committee for Safe Nuclear Policy (SANE) membership growing by over 800 percent. 
Between 1980 and 1984, more than 17 acts of mass nuclear-related civil disobedience were 
recorded.199 Even Ronald Reagan, who initially sought to reintroduce limited nuclear warfare 
into the U.S. national defense lexicon, conceded publically as early as 1982 that “a nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be fought…[t]o those who protest against nuclear war, I can only 
say: ‘I’m with you.’”200 This points to the strength of the nuclear taboo during this period—such 
evidence suggests that any U.S. president would have found it difficult to use nuclear weapons in 
the face of such strong domestic and international opposition. 
 
The Nuclear Taboo Paradox 
 
 The nuclear taboo, however, is only capable of explaining nuclear non-use and little 
more. Nothing within the theory provides us with explanations of state behavior within a case, 
rendering it of limited predictive utility to both academics and policymakers. 
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 To explain state behavior, we turn once again to the nuclear taboo paradox. In a system 
with a robust nuclear taboo, the nuclear taboo paradox predicts increased brinkmanship, 
escalation, and more severe low- to mid-level conflicts. Because of the power of the nuclear 
taboo, nuclear states are reluctant to use their nuclear weapons, a fact that other states are aware 
of as well. As a consequence, rival states are more likely to disregard the nuclear deterrent, 
anticipating instead that a nuclear state will be unwilling to escalate a conflict past a certain point 
in order to avoid major war. Because the taboo has come to dominate strategic thinking 
concerning nuclear weapons, we would expect to see more brinkmanship behavior and 
escalatory tactics than we would in cases where deterrent considerations dominate. 
 In the Afghanistan case, the nuclear taboo paradox predicts that the Soviet Union would 
be willing to intervene militarily in Afghanistan even in the face of an American nuclear 
deterrent. The Soviets should also feel free to escalate their conflict against the mujaheddin, as 
they would expect the United States to have only a limited range of viable responses. For the 
United States, the nuclear taboo paradox also predicts a military response to the Soviet 
intervention as a form of escalation. In such a scenario, we would expect to see Soviet 
policymakers respond with further rounds of escalation and brinkmanship, but an eventual cap 
on such behavior as the conflict progresses toward major war due to a fear of violating the taboo. 
In contrast to the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Afghanistan case does 
not fully fit the predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox—only the Soviet Union’s behavior is 
consistent with our model. The Soviet Union did intervene militarily in Afghanistan, largely 
because of a lack of an existing nuclear deterrent. We also see evidence of limited Soviet 
escalation in Afghanistan beginning in 1981, when the Soviet military initiated a scorched-earth 
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campaign against the mujaheddin insurgents.201 Contrary to our expectations, however, the 
United States refused to become militarily involved in the conflict, opting instead to sanction the 
Soviet Union economically and diplomatically while simultaneously providing money and 
materiel to the mujaheddin. This behavior is much more in line with the predictions of 
deterrence. As a result, we must conclude that our theory does not fully explain the U.S. behavior 
exhibited during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
 The failure of the United States to act in accordance with our predictions may be 
attributable to factors specific to this case that limited both the Soviet Union and the United 
States from escalating the conflict in Afghanistan further than they would have liked. For 
example, the United States was reluctant to use militarily force abroad post-Vietnam, the Soviet 
Union had manpower needs in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union experienced a change in 
leadership in 1985.202 On the U.S. side of the conflict, there is evidence that the Carter 
administration initially desired to take a harder—even military—line against the Soviets; Carter 
himself characterized the initial Soviet invasion as a “grave threat to peace,” “an extremely 
serious threat to peace,” and finally as “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War” 
on January 8, 1980 before scaling back his retaliatory rhetoric thereafter.203 This position was 
shared by other elites in Washington, many of whom would later characterize Afghanistan as the 
confirmation that the Soviet Union was not abiding by the principles of détente. However, 
difficulties quickly arose concerning questions of public acceptance of a stronger U.S. counter-
intervention. Other concerns included the political and practical consequences of an increased 
defense budget, the logistics of developing a deployment force to the region, and the uncertain 
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support of necessary allies in the region for such a move.204 There is also evidence that the 
nuclear taboo may not have been as engrained within the collective Soviet consciousness as it 
was in the Western world; this would consequently undermine the destabilizing influence of the 
nuclear taboo paradox by revitalizing the casual power of nuclear deterrence.205 Together, these 
factors dampened much of the incentive to escalate the severity and brinkmanship behavior 
within the conflict that we would have otherwise anticipated. 
 
Examining the Evidence: Conflict Severity Between the Cases 
Hypothesis 2 seeks to explain behavior caused by the nuclear taboo paradox between 
cases, rather than within them. Specifically, Hypothesis 2 predicts that as the nuclear taboo gains 
in strength, low- to mid-level conflicts should become more severe. To test this hypothesis, I will 
now examine how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compares to our previous two cases in 
terms of conflict severity. 
 
Comparing Conflict Severity: Korea, Cuba, and Afghanistan 
 
 While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is much more similar to Korea than the Cuban 
case, for purposes of comparing conflict severity it represents a third kind of conflict distinct 
from both of our previous cases. In the Korean War, the conflict was essentially a conventional 
dyadic war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, no actual combat operations were initiated, but the 
conflict certainly represents the height of superpower disputes during the Cold War—indeed, it is 
the point at which most historians believe the world came closest to the brink of nuclear war. In 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we see a conventional force—the Soviet army—aligned 
against a primarily insurgent force that dealt in irregular combat operations and guerilla tactics. 
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As before then, it is difficult to compare these three conflicts solely in terms of cost or casualties. 
Rather, I again employ a counterfactual analysis of the Afghanistan conflict to determine where 
the historical case falls on a relative scale of possible outcomes ranked in terms of severity. Once 
rank-ordered, I then compare this severity measurement against those of our other two cases in 
order to test Hypothesis 2. 
 If the Korean War was characterized by extreme restraint and the Cuban Missile Crisis by 
a severe spiral of escalation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan falls somewhere in between. 
Relative to the other two cases, there were also fewer opportunities for elite-level decision-
makers to alter the severity of the conflict. The first critical opportunity was that of the initial 
invasion—Moscow had to decide whether and how to intervene in Afghanistan. Recall that 
although the Soviet Union had a significant interest in the regime and stability of Afghanistan, 
Politburo officials rebuffed every Afghan request for military assistance prior to 1979.206 The 
change in policy to intervene militarily largely came as a recognition that the Amin regime was 
actively contributing to the destabilization of Afghanistan through its insistence on pushing 
through unpopular radical reforms.207 With that said, Soviet displeasure with the Amin regime 
did not on its own necessitate military intervention—the Soviets could have encouraged dissident 
actors within the PDPA to carry out a regime change independently and accompanied this with 
increased economic support. Alternatively, the Soviets could have invaded with a much larger 
force; the Red Army force of just 115,000 troops represented a small fraction of the full Soviet 
force capacity of over four million troops.208 A larger intervention could have resulted in a 
variety of outcomes—on the one hand, overwhelming Soviet numerical superiority might have 
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kept the mujaheddin from organizing in the first place, while on the other hand it could have led 
to a more severe “scorched-earth” campaign against Afghan communities than actually occurred. 
 The Soviet decision to escalate the conflict in 1982 could also have been both more or 
less severe had elite-level decision-making been different. After a year and a half in Afghanistan, 
the Soviets had determined that the mujaheddin were not going to be defeated quickly as 
originally anticipated.209 As a result, Moscow changed operational tactics to a “scorched-earth” 
campaign. In alternative narratives the Soviets could have either substantially escalated the size 
of their presence or initiated their withdrawal much earlier than they actually did. This point also 
represents the most likely moment for a potential intervention by the United States, had 
Washington chosen to directly intervene with military force. In such an alternative scenario, 
direct fighting between U.S. and Soviet military forces would have certainly made the conflict 
more severe, raising the specter of a wider war. 
From these counterfactuals, we can see that there was substantial room for both Soviet 
and U.S. decision-makers to escalate the conflict in Afghanistan. While the conflict that occurred 
historically was not the least severe of all possibilities, it was less severe than it could have been. 
Indeed, I conclude that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less severe than the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. While very similar to Afghanistan in that the historical outcome represents a 
relative “median” on our spectrum of counterfactual outcomes, the Korean War also seems to 
have been a more severe conflict in terms of casualties.210 This result is at odds with Hypothesis 
2, which states that low- and mid-level conflicts will become more severe as the nuclear taboo 
becomes more robust. However, this conclusion is unsurprising in light of the lack of support for 
Hypothesis 1 in this case.  Again, the factors discussed above concerning the unique 
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characteristics of this case likely explain this discrepancy between the empirical evidence and the 
predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I argued that the nuclear taboo paradox can explain Soviet behavior in the 
Afghanistan case, but that its casual power over the behavior of the United States was attenuated 
significantly due to unique factors of the case. As the nuclear taboo became more robust 
worldwide during the 1970s and 1980s, leaders came to accept and internalize the nuclear taboo. 
Although the strength of the nuclear taboo means that few significant discussions of the use of 
nuclear weapons took place, what limited records and recollections we have from key decision-
makers speak to the powerful influence of the nuclear taboo during this period, particularly in the 
West. 
 In the final chapter of this thesis, I will bring together the evidence from the three cases 
and argue that they reveal strong empirical support for the nuclear taboo paradox, suggesting that 
this argument should be tested against additional cases in the future and incorporated into current 
policymaking. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 With the end of the Cold War and the steady stream of formerly classified documents, 
conversations, and meetings that has come with it, it has become increasingly apparent that 
traditional theories of nuclear deterrence and MAD do not fully explain how elite decision-
makers actually came to the policy decisions that they did. In recent years, this emergence of 
new information has spurred the development and acceptance of alternative theories seeking to 
explain Cold War elite behavior and the history of nuclear non-use since 1945. Chief among 
these is the nuclear taboo, which seeks to explain the history of nuclear non-use since World War 
II as a function of an evolving international norm which categorizes nuclear weapons as 
somehow more immoral and inhumane than conventional weapons. Indeed, even the distinction 
between “conventional weapons” and “weapons of mass destruction” is viewed by taboo 
advocates as evidence that there is a normative force at work preventing the use of nuclear 
weapons in conflict. In recent years, scholarship on international norms and the history of 
nuclear decision-making has generated a robust literature pointing to the nuclear taboo as an 
important part of the Cold War narrative. 
 What the nuclear taboo literature has not done to date, however, is explore the full 
theoretical implications of the nuclear taboo. Instead, the overwhelming preponderance of the 
literature has assumed that the nuclear taboo only exhibits stabilizing casual mechanisms, chief 
of which is preventing the use of nuclear weapons in conflict and, consequently, major war. In 
light of what we already know from the realist literature on deterrence and the nuclear stability-
instability paradox, as well as the actual history of the Cold War, this is undoubtedly not a 
comprehensive picture of the nuclear taboo’s casual effects. What was needed was a full 
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theoretical examination of the taboo’s casual mechanisms with a specific focus on possible 
ancillary effects as they might pertain to conflict or elite behavior. 
 In this paper, I sought to rectify this significant gap in the literature, arguing that while 
the nuclear taboo does in fact act to prevent major war, it also has the additional effect of 
increasing the incidence and severity of low- and mid-level conflict. This paradoxical effect is a 
result of international perceptions of a state’s willingness to resort to nuclear weapons in conflict. 
As the nuclear taboo gains influence over elite decision-makers and the international community, 
nuclear states become more reluctant to use their nuclear weapons because of the increased 
reputation costs associated with such an act. Because the nuclear taboo is an international norm, 
all states are aware of this effect, leading rival states to arrive logically at the same conclusion—
that is, that nuclear State A will be unwilling to use its nuclear weapons if challenged in areas of 
peripheral foreign policy interest. As a consequence, rival State B will be more likely to 
disregard any nuclear deterrent State A may have placed over the foreign policy objective, 
concentrating instead only on conventional military and political factors when deciding whether 
to engage in conflict. This disregard then manifests itself as increasingly severe and frequent 
low- and mid-level conflict than we would otherwise expect. 
 
Chapter Summaries & Synthesis 
 
 Following a more extensive theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, which I termed the 
nuclear taboo paradox in Chapter Two, I turned to an empirical examination of the taboo 
paradox’s influence on three different cases selected from the Cold War. In Chapter Three, I 
analyzed the Korean War as the first example of a Soviet challenge to the U.S. policy of 
containment. Following a tracing of the historical narrative of the case, I determined that two 
discrete instances of brinkmanship behavior occurred during the Korean War. Using a 
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comparative analytical framework, I determined that in both instances, deterrence theory, the 
nuclear stability-instability paradox, and traditional nuclear taboo theory all failed to explain 
some or all of the behavior observed in the case. The nuclear taboo paradox, conversely, 
provided a robust explanation for both sub-cases. The overall number of instances of 
brinkmanship behavior was small yet measurable, in accordance with the predictions of the taboo 
paradox. More importantly, elite-level discourse on both sides of the conflict is indicative of 
taboo-based thinking even at this early stage in the nuclear taboo’s evolution. 
 In Chapter Four, I sought to examine a case from the middle of the Cold War to provide 
us with empirical evidence from a period when the nuclear taboo had gained more normative and 
institutional traction. Once I established that the nuclear taboo was in fact increasing in 
international influence, both through grassroots activism and growing elite internalization, I 
tested the elite decision-making from the Cuban Missile Crisis against the predictions of my 
theory. Because the Cuban Missile Crisis was a much more condensed dispute than the Korean 
War, I opted to analyze the case as one extended spiral of brinkmanship rather than discrete 
instances. Tracing the historical narrative, I found that U.S. and Soviet elites took the crisis 
through no less than four distinct rounds of brinkmanship and escalation. As before, I analyzed 
the empirical evidence of the case against the predictions of two alternative realist theories as 
well as traditional nuclear taboo theory in addition to my own. As before, the realist explanations 
failed, while the taboo-based theories fared much better. I also tested my second hypothesis for 
the first time in this chapter, finding that the nuclear taboo paradox does appear to increase the 
severity of low- and mid-level conflicts over time as the nuclear taboo has increased in 
robustness. 
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 Finally, in Chapter Five I analyzed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This case was 
selected because it occurred toward the end of the Cold War, when we expect the nuclear taboo 
to have reached a level of robustness comparable to contemporary levels. Again having 
confirmed this assertion concerning the relative strength and influence of the taboo first, I 
continue with the model set by my previous two chapters. Unlike the results of the Korean and 
Cuban cases, the results of this third case were more ambiguous. The Soviet Union acted in 
accordance with the predictions of the nuclear taboo paradox, escalating the conflict as they 
entered Afghanistan and initiated a “scorched-earth” campaign against the mujaheddin in 1982, 
but the United States was surprisingly reticent to involve itself militarily or otherwise escalate 
the conflict. Likewise, our testing of Hypothesis Two finds that, contrary to predictions, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less severe than either the Korean War or the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Examining the case more closely, I determined that a number of factors unique to the case 
constrained further U.S. action. While it is difficult to prove a negative case, I did find evidence 
suggesting that taboo-based thinking played a critical role in elite-level decision-making during 
Soviet-Afghan conflict. 
 Taking all three of these cases holistically, I find strong empirical support for the 
influence of the nuclear taboo paradox during the Cold War. As the Cold War progressed and the 
nuclear taboo increased in international acceptance and institutionalization, the observed 
conflicts became more severe and we see more and increasingly severe instances of escalation 
and brinkmanship tactics. In all cases, including the Soviet-Afghan War, we see strong evidence 
of taboo-based thinking and discourse among elite decision-makers. Longitudinally, we see more 
evidence of the nuclear taboo and its paradoxical effect on conflict severity as it grows in 
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robustness, again in accordance with our predictions. This presents us with a number of policy 
and research implications, some of which are discussed below. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 As with the development of any new theory or extension of an existing theory, more 
work remains to be done to conclusively establish the presence of the nuclear taboo paradox 
empirically. Progressing forward, additional work ought to be conducted to more 
comprehensively test the casual power of the taboo paradox beyond the three brief case studies 
presented here. Such qualitative work should also be expanded upon with quantitative work, 
perhaps with the development of an objective measurement of the strength of the nuclear taboo 
by country-year compared against existing conflict severity data, such as the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute index. Another interesting line of questioning, as suggested by our Cuban 
Case, is the interaction of the nuclear taboo paradox with other competing modes of strategic 
thinking. For example, do the casual effects of the nuclear taboo paradox and deterrence-based 
strategic thinking always amplify one another, or are there cases where they might dampen—or 
even stabilize—the other’s impact on conflict incidence and severity? 
 Looking more broadly at the nuclear taboo research program, it is clear that much of the 
existing literature requires reevaluation in the light of the nuclear taboo paradox. As previously 
discussed, the great preponderance of the taboo literature presumes that further development of 
the nuclear taboo can only be stabilizing for the international system. Having demonstrated that 
this is not always the case, it is clear that much of this original research must be revisited to 
ensure that the derived conclusions, particularly those of a policy nature, remain valid when the 
casual implications of the nuclear taboo paradox are considered. Additionally, much of the 
nuclear taboo literature, including this work, has been conducted with the presumption that the 
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nuclear taboo only ever increases in robustness and international influence. An important further 
line of research in pursuit of reevaluating the overall taboo literature would be to more carefully 
examine the causes and implications of a weakened nuclear taboo. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
 As the international community continues to grapple with nuclear issues as diverse as 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and safeguarding nuclear materials from falling into the hands of 
rogue non-state actors, the nuclear taboo as a norm and emerging global institution is perhaps 
more relevant to global peace and security today than at any time in the past. Many scholars and 
policymakers have sought to encourage the development of the nuclear taboo internationally as a 
more politically expedient means to permanently remove the threat of nuclear war than 
disarmament. The addition of the nuclear taboo paradox into such thinking, however, points to 
the ultimate futility of such policy. While an overwhelming norm against the use of nuclear 
weapons, or even the institutionalization of a global ban against their use, would indeed prevent 
nuclear war by definition, the nuclear taboo paradox suggests that conventional conflict would 
only become more frequent and severe as the result of such a move. Indeed, most readings of the 
nuclear taboo literature do not discount some of the casual power of nuclear deterrence and 
MAD in preventing major war—what would happen if this buffer against major war was 
removed? In such an extreme case, the extended logic of the nuclear taboo paradox points to a 
world strikingly reminiscent of 1940. Worse yet, such a world contains seventy years of 
improvements and advancements in conventional military technology, much of it designed 
throughout the Cold War explicitly as a replacement for the strategic and tactical capabilities 
promised by nuclear weapons. 
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 Such frightening implications point to the undesirability of an outright global ban on the 
use or possession of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the greatest policy implication of this research 
seems to be that there is a certain “right” amount or robustness of the nuclear taboo, wherein the 
taboo’s stabilizing effects are maximized and the destabilizing elements of the taboo paradox are 
minimized. Determining in fact what such a “right” amount of nuclear taboo promises to be 
daunting task for both policymakers and academics alike. As suggested by the Soviet-Afghan 
case, the robustness of the nuclear taboo is not necessarily universal—it can be stronger in some 
states and weaker in others, and its influence over policymakers will certainly fluctuate over 
time. Even if a comprehensive, real-time measure of the strength of the nuclear taboo was 
developed for every major state, there still remains the question of how best to “fine-tune” the 
strength of the nuclear taboo so as to reach the optimal maximum-minimum point of conflict 
stability. Finally, there remains the question of how to weaken the nuclear taboo, if necessary, 
without destroying the overall normative regime, either in a single state or within the 
international community more broadly. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
 All of these questions point to the unique characteristics of the nuclear taboo in 
international affairs. One is hard-pressed to find another international norm as powerful and 
pervasive, yet untamed in its growth and evolution, as the nuclear taboo. For all the research put 
into the subject and policy work crafted to further it internationally, it may turn out that the 
nuclear taboo and nuclear taboo paradox are largely uncontrollable by policymakers. The 
emergence of the taboo, buoyed through the disparate work of grassroots activists, civil society, 
and individual elite actors, certainly defied the policy preferences and efforts of the original 
nuclear actors. 
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To date, the nuclear taboo has predominantly served the causes of international peace and 
stability by preventing major war that almost certainly would have involved nuclear weapons. As 
we enter a new century of rising states and potential conflict flashpoints, however, individual 
states and the international community at large may soon be faced with an uncomfortable choice: 
permit the nuclear taboo to continue to evolve and gain influence, encouraging severe 
conventional conflict unafraid of nuclear retaliation, or break the nearly seven-decade-long 
tradition of nuclear non-use to reaffirm the utility of nuclear deterrence. Neither option is a 
particularly palatable one, leading us to hope that an as yet unidentified third path might soon 
present itself before such a decision must be made. 
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